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Training prepares individuals, teams, and leaders to operate and maintain the vast array 
of systems that are being acquired, modernized, updated, and enhanced to provide 
operational capabilities.  If a human cannot be properly trained, the entire system will 
function sub-optimally.  The focus on the current study is the time-course results of 
planning and executing training from the inception of a new system to its acquisition and 
support after fielding, in particular for Major Defense Acquisition Programs.  This study 
is the first phase in addressing these issues surrounding the impact of partial, inadequate, 




The purpose of this phase is to gather evidence from the literature published over the past 
30 years, consolidate that evidence into a database, and search for potential gaps between 
what was done and what could have been done given the extant level of knowledge in the 
training community.  This first phase begins to lay the foundation to quantify a 
relationship between the quality of training and its effect on optimizing total systems 
performance.  Reports were identified in the published literature and coded across 36 
variables.  More than 4,000 technical reports and 500 General Accountability Office 




A gap analysis was conducted which searched for differences between an ‗existing 
status‘ and a ‗potential status‘ or what might be the desired status.  Four types of gaps 
were identified: knowledge gap – a best training practice has not been fully validated or 
proven for application for a given training system.; awareness gap – a best training 
practice is proven, established, and relevant, but has not been applied for the training 
system of interest; implementation gap – a valid best training practice has been identified 
and attempted, but did not work properly in the case of a given training system, 
commitment gap – a valid best training practice is recognized but not applied due to 
policy, cost, schedule or other factors.  The phase one analysis yielded 26 instances of 
gaps, validating the need for a more critical treatment of training in major acquisitions.  
The gap and trend analysis of this data provide a start point for the second phase of the 
study which, based on the current findings, examines a series of selected systems for 
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The goal of training is to provide military members with the capacity to perform 
military tasks, both individually and collectively. Military training is seen as a disciplined 
approach to preparing individual warfighters and units for military operations.  Training 
is about exercising troops in the field, training staffs at their operations centers, training 
aircrews while in real or simulated flight, or training maintenance technicians on brand 
new or decades old systems.  Training, then, prepares individuals and teams to operate 
and maintain the vast array of systems that are being acquired, modernized, updated, and 
enhanced to provide operational capabilities.  If a human cannot be properly trained, the 
entire system will function sub-optimally. 
The focus on the current study is the time course of planning and executing 
training from the inception of a new system to its acquisition and support after fielding, in 
particular for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) which are defined as those 
costing in excess of 2 billion dollars.  How adequate are the training plans, what is their 
priority as the system evolves, do they take advantage of known advances in training that 
others have proved to be effective?  This study is the first phase in addressing these issues 
with a longer view to understanding the impact of partial, inadequate, misguided, or 
diminished resources for and approaches to training for new systems.  The purpose of this 
phase is to gather evidence from the literature published over the past 30 years, 
consolidate that evidence into a database, and search for gaps between what was done 
and what could have been done given the level of knowledge in the training community.  
This first phase begins to lay the foundation to quantify a relationship between the quality 
of training and its effect on optimizing total systems performance. 
By itself, this study does not answer fully the issue at hand; rather it is the 
beginning of a multi-phased approach to systematically investigate, document, and 
conclude what the relationship is.  Later phases may revise or expand the database, 
conduct case studies, and explore quantitative techniques that can clearly elucidate the 
many aspects of the problem and how they tie together.  This study, then, is the beginning 
of that endeavor and it starts with collecting and organizing relevant reports from sources 
internal and external to DoD. 
The report first develops a training perspective and discusses the impact of 
simulation and instrumentation on training practices in recent decades.  Continuing the 
background discussion, the role of instructional systems design is then covered, followed 
by the advocacy of training and other people-related consideration in system acquisition.  
The acquisition process is then summarized and policies that impact training are also 
summarized.  The study itself is then presented with methods, data collection and 
analysis, and the essential findings.  We then offer how this study forms the foundation 




II. TRAINING PERSPECTIVE 
Gorman (1990) in his report, The Military Value of Training, discusses the value 
of training in terms of historical  ―combat exposure‖ data drawn from air combat fighter 
engagements from World War I and II, the Korean conflict, and Viet Nam. In all these 
wars, the data show that a relatively few number of participants account for most of the 
successful engagement outcomes – or enemy kills. The data from wartime statistics 
showed clearly that those warriors who survived the first 5 or so combat engagements 
went on to engage and succeed in producing most of the combat kills.  Such data led to 
strategies that created training systems designed to replicate wartime engagement 
experiences – or in the words of the warrior- you train like you will fight.  
Examples often used to describe highly realistic combat training include the 
Fighter Weapons School, known as TOPGUN (Baranek, 2010). This school provides air-
to-air combat training using instrumented ranges that allow pilots under instruction to fly 
their combat aircraft in realistic engagements against professional aviation instructors 
who serve as competent adversaries.  Air to air combat engagements are recorded and 
played back in order to provide after action review and expert tactical instructor 
performance feedback to pilots under training. As a result of such planned, organized and 
systematic application of technology and explicit instructional principles exemplified by 
TOPGUN, the kill to loss ratio in Vietnam moved from 3:1 to 12:1 over a four year 
training period between 1969 – 1973 (Gorman, 1990).  
Unless manpower and personnel selection approaches can acquire and assign  
highly qualified, pre-trained individuals directly from the civilian economy to operate and 
maintain new equipment, the development of training is an imperative.  This necessity, of 
course, has been recognized and training has always been a component of system 
acquisition plans.  Indeed, training systems acquisition is an increasingly important 
aspect of program acquisition extending over the full acquisition life cycle. 
 
A. TRAINING SIMULATION 
The use of instrumented training ranges, like the US Navy‘s Tactical Air Combat 
Training System used by TOPGUN and the USAF Red Flag Training Range was closely 
followed by the rise of advanced simulation training. The use of advanced flight 
simulators also emphasized the principle of providing ―realistic combat training.‖  A key 
aspect of simulation, over instrumented ranges was the expectation of reducing training 
cost by using simulators instead of actual operational aircraft or other expensive weapon 
platforms. But the use of simulation during the 70‘s and 80‘s in particular raised certain 
questions and concerns about technical issues surrounding the degree of realism that such 
simulation could deliver. Some of the main issues and concerns that arose during 
development and application of simulation training were summarized and discussed in a 
report published by the Institute for Defense Analysis entitled The Value of Simulation 
for Training. Some of the key issues are as briefly summarized below: 
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 Can the simulation constructed actually represent the actual equipment and/or 
operating environment with sufficient ―fidelity‖ – or in the eyes of the operator 
and maintainer – is the simulation ―realistic‖ enough for the training required? 
 How do the relative costs and effectiveness of simulators compare to simply using 
the actual equipment in its real – world environment? 
 Can a given simulation device be used to reduce the time or number of training 
events required to achieve the same training objectives in the actual equipment? 
 What are some of the best practices in using simulation? Such as (1) the proper 
balance between the use of simulation and live training ranges, (2) the appropriate 
allocation of training time between part task and full mission simulation devices. 
 Can certain exclusions and limitations be employed in simulation with minimum 
impact on training effectiveness (for example, lack of motion in flight simulation 
or limited visual field of view, and or display resolution for visual flight 
simulation? 
 What is the most appropriate type and level of training management and 
instructional support required to facilitate device utilization and instructional 
quality (Orlansky, Dahlman, Hammon, Metzko, Taylor, and Youngblut, 1994). 
 
The authors (Orlansky, et al 1994) conclude that flight and maintenance 
simulators train as well as the actual equipment and typically cost less to produce and 
operate than the actual equipment. Another important finding was that across simulation 
domains, most problems were not attributed to the lack of operational realism or 
simulation fidelity but rather were due to poor training development planning, the 
absence of instructional support and training features on the simulation device (such as 
recording and playback).  
Finally, it is clear from the information provided in the Orlansky study‘s literature 
review and other studies that the effectiveness of a training device depends less on the 
simulation technology used and more on the quality of the training plan and how the 
simulation training process is actually supported and managed. See also Stewart, J.E., 
Johnson, D.M, & Howse, W.R. (2008) for more detail on this subject.  There are some 
persistent issues associated with the development and application of such technology - 
based training systems that may impact training effectiveness, such as:  
1. Training need is not recognized or requirement is misunderstood. 
2. Training need is recognized but is not supported because of policy or resource 
limitations. 
3. Technology needed for training is not mature enough or otherwise 
unavailable.  
4. Training System is implemented but it is not properly managed or used 
effectively. 
5. Training System development lags behind the weapon system operational 
implementation. 
6. The Training System implemented is poorly designed /or otherwise cannot 




B. INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT (ISD) 
 
With the rise of advanced training simulation application in the 70‘s and 80‘s, 
there was a concerted attempt to broadly apply various ―systems approaches‖ to the 
design, development and evaluation of military training systems. During this period the 
US military training establishment ultimately created a uniform standard referred to as 
the Interservice Instructional Systems Development (ISD) procedure (Branson, 1978).  
In brief, ISD was supposed to provide a means to drive training design and 
development through the use of a phased systematic process that began with detailed 
requirements analysis (including trainee knowledge and skill specification) and finished 
with specific training evaluations dedicated to validating the effectiveness of the training 
system.  However, after ten years of application of the ISD model in military training, it 
became apparent that simply having a systematic framework with its detailed procedural 
process was not enough to ensure effective training. McCombs, B.L. (1986) reviewed 
literature on the origin, application and effectiveness of ISD Analysis, Design, 
Development, Implementation, and Evaluation - or the so-called ADDIE model. 
McCombs concluded that the use of ISD per se did not necessarily result in the most 
effective training.  
For example a serious problem with ISD was the assumption that people using the 
approach have the requisite knowledge and skills to appropriately and effectively apply 
the process. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. McCombs argued that often the 
people implementing ISD did not fully understand the training requirement, or lacked the 
technical skills necessary to apply the methods specified in the ISD process (such as task 
analysis, skill specification, and evaluation methods). 
Another ISD issue is that the process itself does not provide sufficient detail to 
map out valid instructional strategies and media selection prescriptions, based on a 
scientific understanding of specific learning domains or complex tasks.  For an updated 
description of the ADDIE model and its application in education and training see Hodell 
(2000) ISD from the Ground Up. And for an updated military equivalent description see 
also Department of Defense (2001) Instructional Systems Development/Systems 
Approach to training and education (MIL-HDBK-29612-2A), which applies to training 
development for new systems. 
Training is often joined with other ‗people factors‘ and variably termed 
human systems integration (HSI) or by Service programs, such as the overarching 
Army effort known as MANPRINT, or manpower, personnel and training 
integration program.  Current acquisition policy requires that a program manager 
have a plan for HSI in place early in the acquisition process to ―ensure that the 
system is built to accommodate the characteristics of the user population that will 
operate, maintain, and support the system.‖   Further requirements are that 
―human-factors engineering to design systems that require minimal manpower; 
provide effective training; can be operated and maintained by users; and are 
suitable (habitable and safe with minimal environmental and occupational health 
hazards) and survivable (for both the crew and equipment)‖ (DoDI 5002.2, 2008).  
Program managers are required to summarize the HSI plan in the Acquisition 
Strategy and the Systems Engineering Plan.  Extracts from relevant DoD policies 
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as issued in various directives, instructions, and regulations are presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
C. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
The concept of Human Systems Integration emerged in the 1990‘s and is the 
current prevailing systems engineering framework now promulgated by the Department 
of Defense. The founding premise of HSI as stated by (DoD 5000.02: Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System, 2009) is as follows: 
The Program Management (PM ) shall have a plan for HSI in place early in the 
acquisition process to optimize total system performance, minimize total ownership costs, 
and ensure that the system is built to accommodate the characteristics of the user 
population that will operate, maintain, and support the system. 
Human Systems Integration (HSI) refers to the planning and integration of such 
areas as manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system safety, 
personnel survivability, and health hazards – thereby clearly reflecting the origins of the 
systems framework originally outlined by MANPRINT (Booher, 1990, Clark and 
Goulder, 2002). 
An important goal of HSI is to influence acquisition decisions early in the 
Defense acquisition management framework. In particular, HSI solutions need to be 
identified early enough to allow changes in design. For example, 40 percent of the Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) is determined by Milestone A. LCC is the total cost to the government 
of acquisition and ownership of that system over its useful life(Office of Naval Research, 
2011). 
With the brief overview here, we have come full circle with attempts to integrate 
training into the system acquisition process, beginning with ISD, then MANPRINT and 
now HSI all emphasizing early and systematic consideration to personnel training within 
a ―systems engineering‖ framework that addresses all of the design and logistical support 
functions thought to be essential in creating and effective weapon system. 
The program manger is required to work with the training community to develop 
options for individual and collective training for operators, maintainers, and support 
personnel.  Training decisions need to be based on training effectiveness evaluations to 
maintain skill proficiencies and reduce individual and collective training costs. The PM 
shall develop training system plans to maximize the use of new learning techniques, 
simulation technology, embedded training and distributed learning (DoD Instruction 
1322.26), and instrumentation systems that provide ―anytime, anyplace‖ training and 
reduce the demand on the training establishment. Where possible, the PM shall maximize 
the use of simulation-supported embedded training, and the training systems shall fully 
support and mirror the interoperability of the operational system (DoD Directive 
1322.18). 
 
D. MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL INTEGRATION (MANPRINT) 
The Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) program initiated in the 
1980‘s is a more comprehensive, attempt to apply a ―systems approach‖ to weapon 
system acquisition by providing a framework that calls for early consideration of key 
system planning activities and development requirements. The founding premise of 
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MANPRINT holds that the… The system must be designed so that the specified target 
population can be easily trained to perform to standard (p.6) 
MANPRINT is a comprehensive management and technical effort designed to 
assure integration of all relevant information from MANPRINT domains. The primary 
goals of MANPRINT are to develop the most effective system and to achieve 
effectiveness at lower life cycle costs. (Metzler, and Lewis 1989, p.1)  MANPRINT 
considers seven key areas in the process of system acquisition (US Army 2001) – with 
Training as the third area: 
Seven MANPRINT areas:  
1) Manpower – The number of personnel, both military and civilian required, 
authorized and potentially available to operate, maintain, and support each system 
acquisition. 
2) Personnel – The human aptitudes, skills, and capabilities required to operate, 
maintain, and support a system in peacetime and war.  
3) Training – The instruction and resources required to provide [Army] personnel 
with requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly operate, maintain, and 
support [Army] systems. 
4) Human Factors Engineering – The comprehensive integration of human 
capabilities and limitations into system definition, design, and evaluation to 
promote effective soldier – machine integration for optimal total system 
performance. 
5) System Safety – The design and operational characteristics of a system that 
minimize the possibilities for accidents or mishaps caused by human error or 
system failure. 
6) Health Hazards – The systematic application of biomedical knowledge, early in 
the acquisition process, to identify, assess and minimize health hazards associated 
with the system‘s operation, maintenance, repair or storage. 
7) Soldier Survivability – The characteristics of a system that reduce fratricide as 
well as reduce detectability of the soldier, prevent attack if detected, prevent 
damage if attacked, minimize medical injury if wounded or otherwise injured, and 
minimize physical and mental fatigue (p.8) 
 
MANPRINT, in part, was developed as a consequence of documented problems 
found in weapon system acquisition due to a failure to properly integrate Manpower, 
Personnel, and Training (MPT) into the weapon system.  For example study completed 
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1985, p. 2, raised the following issues: 
 No one was in charge of implementing MPT integration 
 MPT requirements were not being identified early enough in the acquisition 
process to influence system design 
 The Army was not clearly defining weapon system MPT needs for the developers 
 
 In this 1985 study, the GAO concluded that The Army must effectively integrate 
manpower, personnel and training into its weapon systems acquisition process to ensure 
that when the weapon systems are deployed, they can be satisfactorily operated and 
maintained (p.1) 
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It is one purpose of this current study to determine how many of these problems, 
and other possible issues remain after 26 years – given the expected improvements in the 
acquisition process following the introduction and implementation of MANPRINT. 
 
 
III. ACQUISITION PHASES 
 
The acquisition of new systems, of course, progress through phases.  The DoD 
acquisition model encompasses five phases related to pre-systems acquisition activity, the 
formal system acquisition, and the necessary sustainment phase.  Training is conceived, 
planned, developed, and implemented throughout these phases.  Three Milestone 
Decision Reviews (A, B, and C) accompany the phases.   The five phases are: 
 
 Concept Refinement –During this phase a study called an analysis of alternatives 
is conducted to assess alternatives to provide the desired capability identified in 
the Initial Capabilities Document  (ICD). To achieve the best possible system 
solution, materiel solution analysis places emphasis on innovation and 
competition and on existing commercial off-the-shelf and other solutions drawn 
from a diverse range of large and small businesses. An analysis of alternatives and 
a technology development strategy are developed to help guide the efforts during 
the next phase, which is technology development. Materiel solution analysis ends 
when materiel solution to the capability need identified in the ICD is 
recommended by the lead component. 
 
 Technology Development – This phase addresses the set of technologies to be 
integrated into a full system, including the training capability.  This phase 
depends on the system developer having productive relationships with both the 
user and the science and technology community.  The process is continuous and 
iterative, refining user requirements while assessing the maturity and feasibility of 
technologies. 
 
 System Development and Demonstration – The acquisition is formally initiated 
and a Program Manager assumes responsibility for system development.  
Transition to this phase requires approval of a capability development document, 
which reflects a technically mature capability that is logistically supportable.  This 
phase develops a system or an increment of capability, completing full system 
integration.  Operational supportability is ensured with particular attention to 




 Production and Development –  The purpose of this phase is to achieve an 
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. Operational test and evaluation 
shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system. Milestone C 
authorizes entry into low rate initial production (for MDAPs and major systems), 
into production or procurement for non-major systems that do not require low rate 
initial production, or into limited deployment in support of operational testing. 
 
 Operations and Support –During this phase, full operational capability is 
achieved, each element of logistics support is evaluated (e.g., supply, 
maintenance, training, technical data, support equipment), and operational 
readiness is assessed. Logistics and readiness concerns dominate this phase. The 
operations and support phase includes life cycle sustainment and disposal. 
 
Milestone A occurs upon the approval of the Concept-Refinement Stage and 
Milestone B upon approval to proceed into the Technology Development Phase.  The 
achievement of Milestone C launches the production and deployment phase. 
 
A. MILESTONE A:  ENTRY INTO TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
PHASE 
The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk and to determine the 
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system.  The project shall enter 
Technology Development at Milestone A when the MDA has approved the Technology 
Development Strategy.  
 
B. MILESTONE B:  ENTRY INTO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEMONSTRATION (SDD) PHASE 
The purpose of the SDD phase is to develop a system or an increment of 
capability; reduce integration and manufacturing risk (technology risk reduction occurs 
during Technology Development); ensure operational supportability with particular 
attention to reducing the logistics footprint; implement human systems integration (HSI); 
design for producibility; ensure affordability and the protection of critical program 
information (CPI); and demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and 
utility.   
This effort is intended to demonstrate the ability of the system to operate in a 
useful way consistent with the approved Key Performance Parameters.  
The completion of this phase is dependent on a decision by the MDA to commit 
to the program at Milestone C or a decision to end this effort. 
 
C. MILESTONE C: ENTRY INTO PRODUCTION AND 
DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
The purpose of the Production and Deployment phase is to achieve an operational 
capability that satisfies mission needs.  Operational test and evaluation shall determine 
the effectiveness and suitability of the system.  Milestone C authorizes entry into Low 
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Rate Initial Production (for MDAPs and major systems), into production or procurement 
(for non-major systems that do not require LRIP) or into limited deployment in support of 
operational testing for MAIS programs or software-intensive systems with no production 
components.  This effort delivers the fully funded quantity of systems and supporting 
materiel and services for the program or increment to the users.  During this effort, units 
shall attain Initial Operational Capability. 
 
D. POST MILESTONE C:  OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT 
The objective of this activity is the execution of a support program that meets 
operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-
effective manner over its total life cycle.  When the system has reached the end of its 
useful life, it shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner.  Operations and Support has 
two major efforts: Sustainment and Disposal. 
Over the last several decades the DoD has initiated several efforts aimed at 
process update, and the increased efficiency to be found in a streamlined process for 
major systems acquisition.  Consistently during this time the user/operators have 
observed that the acquisition process is too slow, too cumbersome in terms of the 
quantity and volume of documents and in the end provides some systems that by the time 
they are fielded are out of date with technology once they emerge from the long arduous 
process.  It should be recognized that technology insertion is very dependent on the class 
of acquisition with systems with intense software and communications dependencies 
being the most likely to suffer from the decades long process. 
 
E. FRONT END ANALYSIS 
The Defense acquisition process consists of the phases and milestones described 
in earlier paragraphs.  During the early or  ―front end‖ of the acquisition process, the 
Concept Refinement Phase, incorporates detailed analysis including an analysis of 
alternatives to assess various materiel, software, and technologies solutions to shape 
capabilities to best meet the military operational requirements.  A recent topic of 
discussion in Defense Leadership meetings (Hartman, 2009) has been the need for more 
rigorous assessments in the earliest stages of the acquisition process. Assessment in the 
earliest stages can be most productive in effectively and efficiently meeting the 
warfighter needs.  It is further believed that early incorporation of system training details 
in the pre-milestone A analysis has great benefit in achieving the best possible system 
solution and can positively impact each stage of the acquisition life cycle.  Particularly 
those systems with significant human interface requirements are found to benefit from 
bringing in training systems planning in the concept refinement process in a series of 
iterations with the end users.  Early systems prototypes (constructive or virtual 
simulations) for instance can be a very effective tool in narrowing down and shaping the 
final desired capability with the warfighters.  The use of modeling and simulation and 
incorporation of a systems engineering approach to systems training can logically drive 
the future system training tools, simulators and part-task trainers, as appropriate.  In 
major acquisition programs, the ability to insert training early in the program can help 
shape the final quantities and technical complexity of the end capability.  From a senior 
DoD management perspective, proper front end analysis to include the systems training 
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considerations can permit a go or no-go decision and/or justify significant modifications 
prior to the commitment of large, long term fiscal resources. 
 
 
IV. OVERVIEW OF PHASE I PROJECT 
 
This research addresses key topics raised in the recent Strategic Plan for the Next 
Generation Training for the Defense Department, issued by the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and signed by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense on September 23, 2010.  In particular, the call for action to develop 
training capabilities and regimens before a system is fielded to improve initial operational 
effectiveness of new capabilities (§5.6.2) and the call to treat the training capabilities of 
new systems with the same rigor as their operational capabilities and updating as 
appropriate (§5.6.3) are relevant to the current study.  Training is required to bridge the 
gap between the operators, maintainers, and leaders existing level of knowledge and that 
level required to operate and maintain the system. 
An underlying theme of the study is to estimate the role of training on optimizing 
total systems performance for major acquisitions.   Traditionally, training for major new 
systems is not fully provided until after initial operational capability.  However, if the 
human operator of the system cannot perform efficiently, the entire system will not 
function optimally.  Training is but one factor here.   The purpose of this study is to 
assess the value of early consideration of Acquisition System training requirements for 
new systems being acquired, or being considered, by the Department of Defense.  The 
study is to be based on evidence gathered in the research and analysis literature, dating to 
systems acquired from 1976 to the present day. 
The two central research questions are: 1) Is there a benefit to the warfighters 
(operators, maintainers and leaders) and the acquisition community with early 
consideration of systems training in major acquisitions? and 2) Does early system 
training contribute to initial readiness and full utilization of system‘s capability upon 
initial delivery?  In constructing a database to address these specific questions, other 
relationships of interest can emerge.  For example, research that documents the success of 
a particular training approach relevant to a specific system may have been available, but 
was neglected in planning the training system requirements of another.  The identification 
of such gaps is pivotal to the Phase I study.  The gaps, for example, can separate 
occurrences of diminished system performance on the basis of the training practices used 
or not used, serving as a basis for improvement. 
This study draws from historic documents and the traditional knowledge that the 
systems acquisition process, although inclusive of training plans, traditionally addresses 
training late in the process and doesn‘t incorporate the advantages found in going beyond 
the instructional systems development process to determine training system 
characteristics.  The technology advances that enable the ability to deliver learning 
content in a many forms of simulators, simulations, games and on-line courses has 
radically impacted the traditional ways of considering systems training in the acquisition 
process.  Longitudinal analysis of key program documents provides specific examples, 
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both positive and negative, regarding the need for including training systems analysis 
early in the acquisition and continuing throughout the system life cycle. 
 
A. GOALS 
The goal of this phase is to establish an overarching framework and research 
methodology for the study.  The more detailed objectives of the initial phase are to 
identify source material, specify a working set of variables, establish coding rules, and set 
plans for the data capture during the second phase.  The study formally started on 1 
October 2010 with the Naval Postgraduate School as the lead activity, supplemented by 
technical staff from the Institute for Defense Analyses and Alion Science and 
Technology.  The study team consisted of experts with backgrounds in research 
psychology, operations research, training analysis, human factors engineering, and 
system safety, totaling more than 100 years of expertise within DoD. 
 
B. KEY CONCEPTS 
At a meeting hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School on 21 October 2010, the 
study team openly considered a wide range of concepts relevant to the study, such as 
system training plans, training support plans, human systems integration, domain 
integration, cost training effectiveness analysis, isometric performance curves, DoD 5000 
series of instructions, service regulations, training thresholds, manpower factors, 
instructional methods, and many others.  The discussion stimulated numerous ideas for 
refinement in planning the scope and research methodology for Phase I. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  What is the value of early training system design, development, 
implementation and a well-planned training program? (i.e. ―doing it right‖).  
2. Are there specific gaps in applying ―best training practices‖ during the major 
weapon system acquisition process that impact training effectiveness, and/ limit 
operational capabilities and readiness? 
 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The study team considered alternative methods for assessing the evidence from 
the literature.  Developing a predictive model was deemed unsuitable as there was no 
clearly defined dependent variable to predict in a consistent way across a wide variety of 
systems.  The nature of the evidence can sometimes be qualitative and subjective, while 
at other times it can be quantitative and objective, such as ‗striking a target‘ or achieving 
a certain level of reliability.  Rather than pursue a purely quantitative but highly limited 
analysis, the study team adopted a holistic point of view on capturing data values from 
the body of published evidence.  Thus, at times a documented deficiency might be poor 
performance in operational testing.  At other times, a low level of acceptance by field 
units due to training issues or a high rate of safety mishaps after fielding due to human 
error, human systems integration, or insufficient training would be the documented 
deficiency.  The key is to link any deficiencies to a lag in delivering a robust training 
capability at the time of initial delivery of the system.  Such a search for evidence from 
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reports and other case studies would be conducted on a case-by-case basis across the 
spectrum of major systems acquired between 1976 and 2010.  The priority and status of 
training early in the acquisition process is of greatest concern. 
The study team decided to focus first on a comprehensive collection of reports 
and documents relevant to the research questions, beginning with a sample of reports.  A 
preliminary set of variables were nominated within the first two weeks of the study.  
Furthermore, the team saw value in identifying gaps in what the system training offered 
compared to what it could have offered as documented elsewhere in the literature, mainly 
by reports from industry and the Defense Laboratories.  This value addresses the call to 
develop training capabilities and regimens before a system is fielded, as advocated in the 
Strategic Plan for the Next Generation Training.  In view of the goals of the study and 
the limitations of source data, a gap analysis was chosen as the appropriate research 
methodology. 
Gap analysis generally refers to the activity of studying the differences between 
an ‗existing status‘ and a ‗potential status‘ or what might be the desired state.  It is a 
method more commonly used in the study of business processes and services, such as 
closing the gap in the level of service quality or the time for service delivery. In the 
context of the Training Systems Study, the existing status is the documented approach to 
training as part of a major systems acquisition, especially at the time a system acquisition 
passes Milestone B, the entrance of the System Development and Demonstration phase 
within the Defense Acquisition Management Framework.  Analysis of these data and 
trends would address the two central research questions.  The ‗potential status’ refers to a 
training capability, also documented in the literature, for the same or a like-kind system 
that has demonstrated level of effectiveness that might exceed that of the training system 
portrayed in Milestone B documentation.  Such cases of exceptional training may be 
considered a best practice.  For example, there may be documented findings concerning 
the training for a command and control system for an air-ground system in the land forces 
that could equally apply to training for a maritime command and control system.  Gap 
analysis relies upon determining the existing status is for a system and comparing it to a 
potential status at a particular point in time. 
The focus of the early work on the study is to create a comprehensive record of 
findings, first on the status of training plans and intentions for an existing system and 
secondly on the status of training capabilities known beforehand or at the same point in 
time.  To accomplish this, source materials need to be identified, variables need 
definition, rules for coding the variables need explanation, and the overall record needs a 
database structure suitable for detailed analysis.  The four key steps needed to be taken 
are: 
1. Seek an understanding of the environment surrounding the training issue. 
2. Take a holistic view of the acquisition and training environment to gain a 
complete understanding. 
3. Determine what framework the study will use for assessment of the problem. 
4. Provide data supporting the analysis that is undertaken. 
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A. STEP 1 – UNDERSTANDING THE TRAINING ISSUE 
The systems acquisition process is governed by rules, regulations, instructions, 
handbooks, etc.  Planning documents for training define the design, development, 
funding, equipment, support, modification, operation, and management for future training 
system requirements.  The training system design typically uses the instructional systems 
development (ISD) process to determine specific training system characteristics, 
including media, training requirements, and instructional courses.  How all of this fits 
into the total acquisition picture needs to be understood, and how it has changed over 
time is important to recognize. 
B. STEP 2 – HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE ACQUISITION AND 
TRAINING ENVIRONMENT 
The acquisition of a major system is a long and complex process in which costs 
must be controlled while tradeoffs are being made.  The GAO has consistently designated 
the DoD management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area (GAO-09-
431T), with an average schedule delay in delivering initial capabilities of 21 months.  A 
perspective is needed on how training system plans, or a lack thereof, may contribute to 
system deficiencies and delays, while considering technological advances that could 
improve training effectiveness/efficiency. 
C. STEP 3 - GAP ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
 
Gap analysis is an effective solution for ongoing performance improvement and 
quality assurance activities that identify shortcomings in a business practice, here the 
acquisition process.  Gap analysis utilizes comparative analysis techniques, thus it is 
essential to identify the nature of the current processes in order to make comparisons.  
The types of gaps that can be examined are: 
Knowledge gap – a best training practice has not been fully validated or proven 
for application for a given training system. 
Awareness gap – a best training practice is proven, established, and relevant, but 
has not been applied for the training system of interest. 
 
Implementation gap – a valid best training practice has been identified and 
attempted, but did not work properly in the case of a given training system. 
 
Commitment gap – a valid best training practice is recognized but not applied due 
to policy, cost, schedule or other factors. 
D. STEP 4 – DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
The collection of valid data, based to the greatest extent possible on empirical findings 
and from trusted sources is critical.  Not acceptable are ‗sea stories‘, anecdotal evidence, 
or other forms of judgments that are not firmly rooted in fact.  Benchmarking, the process 
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used to evaluate performance against other systems‘ practices and performance standards, 
is also an acceptable tool. 
E. APPROACH 
 
The main approach is to refine the concepts into a workable set and then 
formulate a set of variables that reflect the concepts for inclusion in the database 
structure.  The database consists of an organized collection of data captured from source 
documents.  Each record in the database represents an individual document, although it is 
possible that multiple documents may be merged into a single record, such as data from a 
GAO report on a particular system which has other data already recorded.  As depicted in 
Table 1, the record is the title of the report, represented as a row (in SQL terminology) or 
a tuple (in relational terminology).  The variables, represented as a column (in SQL 
terminology) or attribute (in relational terminology) represent data values.  For example, 
a Year variable indicates the year of publication for a particular report, such as 1999.  The 
data types will vary, and coding rules will specify the rules and constraints for variable 
declarations. 
 
Table 1. Organization of Database 
 Record 1 Record 2 etc. 
Variable 1    
Variable 2    
etc.    
 
The study team then considered potential variables.  The principal investigator 
proposed a starting set of variables: six as report descriptors, thirteen related to system 
specifics, and seven related to training practices. 
 
F. REFINEMENT OF VARIABLES 
 
The study team reviewed 60 variables nominated by individual members of the 
team.  To make the study practical, the number needed to be reduced by about one-third 
or more.  Upon feedback from the sponsor and another round of internal review, the 
variables were pared down based on discussion and consensus building.  The coding rules 
for the database were then articulated, and the pursuit of reports and other forms of 
documentation can begin. 
The variables can further be clustered into topical areas such as those relating to 
the nature of the report, those providing specifics on the system and acquisition of 
training for the system, and those related to training capabilities from experimentation 
with the system or with like-kind systems.  This list was narrowed several times, resulting 
in 37 variables including a summary comment block.  The final set of variables selected 




Table 2.  Listing of variables 
Variables 
Database Entry # 
 Rater Initials 
 
1. Report Document Title 
2. ADA number (DTIC) 
3. Other reference (journal, book chapter, conference paper, other report) 
4. Pages  
5. Corporate Author 
6. Year of Report 
7. Type of Activity publishing/submitting report (not necessarily sponsor) 
8. Funding for Report Document (possible R&D funding for report on Major System) 
9. System Name or Program Number (PNO) for more recent acquisitions 
10. System Type - Functional Capability 
11. Acquisition Phase (as of Year of Report variable)  
12. Acquisition Cost - Major Defense Acquisition Program 
13. Requirement Source  
14. Who developed training – prime, sub 
15. Training Support Plan  – completeness, depth, etc. 
16. System Training Plan – completeness, depth, etc. 
17. Embedded Training 
18. System Safety/Health Hazards/Survivability - training relationship specified 
19. Domain Integration - training tradeoffs between domains 
20. Rapid Acquisition - training consideration 
21. Spiral Development (or incremental analysis, evolutionary acquisition) 
22. System of Systems approach -  training consideration 
23. Training Effectiveness Analysis or TE Evaluation 
24. Individual Training MOE/MOPs 
25. Collective MOE/MOPs 
26. Maintenance MOE/MOPs (crew related & system related) 
27. Operational Test Sites 
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28. Based on empirical evidence 
29. Use of military test subjects 
30. Quantifiable Level of Learning (Kirkpatrick Model, (Kirkpatrick, 1988)) 
31. Based on multiple studies 
32. Proprietary solution for training delivery (relates to S9) 
33. Generalizability within/across system types 
34.  Year of GAO (or DOTE, IG) report 
35. Year of GAO/DOTE/IG Report 
36. Shortcomings on training (effectiveness, cost, currency etc.) 
37. Summary comments, potential gaps, observations 
 
G. SOURCE DOCUMENTS 
Databases for a computer-based literature searches were identified early.  The 
primary sources are the Defense Technical Information Center, the National Simulation 
and Training Asssociation‘s collection of papers from the I/ITSEC conferences, 
PsychInfo, and the ERIC databases, and also collections at the Naval Postgraduate School 
and the Air Force Institute of Technology.  Inquiries to relevant programs and system 
documentation in the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Acquisition University led 
to additional sources.  The reports from these sources belong to the general category of 
Technical Reports.  The annual report of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 
reports from the DoD Inspector General, and reports from the General Accountability 
Office served as sources for documented shortcomings in acquisitions from a training 
standpoint.  The sources belong to the general category of Consequential Reports. 
The study team then focused on source documents.  Some initial results of searching 
data sources include 2,694 hits on the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 
database using the terms ―training AND acquisition.‖  A search of the General 
Accountability Office (GAO) database resulted in 1,600 hits using the term ―Defense 
Acquisition.‖  A secondary search of a small number of individual reports returned 
occasional references to training, some incidental some useful.  For example, an examination 
of a 1985 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-85-154) to the Secretary of the Army on integrating 
manpower, personnel and training into the weapons acquisition process contained an 
appendix listing of 85 reports on the topic from across the Services and DoD.  Other sources 
identified are two academic databases, IITSEC papers, theses and dissertations, reports 
available from the Defense Acquisition University, documentation from program 
management offices, reports from Operational Testing and Evaluation, and internal industry 
reports.  MANPRINT assessments and related reports from the Army were also sampled 
from the comprehensive collection assembled by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory 
(Middlebrooks, 2010).  Cost data were derived primarily from the Selected Acquisition 
Report Summary Tables, provided every month by Office of the Under Secretary for 
Defense, Acquisition Technology & Logistics.  The data for the month of June were used for 
a given year.   The net search would likely lead to several thousand source documents, a 
selected set which would be coded for Phase I of the study. 
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Figure 1 depicts the flow of materials from the two categories of source materials to 
the coded database.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Depiction of Coding Process 
 
H. CODING DATABASE 
Searches on key databases resulted in more than 4,000 candidate reports that were 
technical in nature.  Since the nature of the study was exploratory, the list was narrowed.  
Each report was searched for the term ‗train‘ and if a rater judged the context as relevant 
to the study, a copy of the report was obtained and coded.  Members of the study team 
served as coders.  A workshop in March 2010 provided examples of coding with 
feedback and comments by team members as a means to reach agreements in coding 
protocol and later maintain a high level of coding conformity.  Many of the variables, 
though, were simply facts identified in the study reports or from external sources on a 
particular acquisition program, such as costs. 
Abstractions of the database are provided in Appendix C, with separate sections 
for the technical and GAO reports.  The technical reports are presented in chronological 
order so the database entry is a unique but arbitrary assignment used for quickly locating 
the record.  For the purposes of the immediate gap analysis presented later in this report, 
the abstractions provide: database entry (locator), title of report, year of report, Service or 










whether the findings can be generalized to other systems, and a brief description of the 
finding as it relates to the goals of the study.  An example is: 
49 
Human Factors Performance Data for Future Forward Area Air Defense Systems (FAADS) 
1989 
Army 
Forward Area Air Defense Systems (FAADS) 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Testifying before Congress in 1977, an Army official stated that "We expect this somewhat unorthodox approach to 
permit a much reduced development time, thus resulting in an earliest fielding date, albeit with higher but acceptable 
risks.‖  Despite the use of many off the shelf technologies that were intended to allow rapid and low-cost 
development, a series of technical problems and massive cost overruns resulted in the cancellation of the Sergeant 
York project in 1985 by the Secretary of Defense.        Although much of the processing of the collected data was also 
cancelled or brought to a hasty conclusion, an extensive follow-on evaluation was conducted.  The research 
documented the analysis of training and human factors-related data from the Sgt York Follow-On Evaluation I, which 
generated objective performance measures on individual soldier, team, and system performance.  Objective 
performance data were examined with respect to fourteen issues, such as varying target workloads on the operator or 
the negative impact of some semi-automation.  The data yielded findings on many issues relevant to the design of a 
future area air defense system. The report provides suggestions on applying such data to future soldier-system 
performance models, which can be remarkably helpful in making decisions about future FAADS.  Awareness Gap 
input:  Failures of cancelled system can lead to training and performance improvements in similar, follow on systems 
if properly analyzed.  Implementation Gap input: Maintaining detailed human performance data during DT/OT allows 
secondary analyses for other system designers. 
 
The GAO reports were abstracted in a slightly different manner.   To distinguish 
these from the technical reports, the database entry numbering begins with 500.  The 
abstractions provide: database entry (locator), title, year, Service or Joint, system, GAO 
report identification, passabe from report with context for training issue.  An example is: 
503 





In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the projected range and sensor tracking capability of AIM-9X 
without the helmet-mounted cueing system is equivalent to the capability of the AA-11 threat missile in azimuth and 
exceeds the capability of the AA-11 in range. DOD‘s position is based on using the fighter aircraft radar to cue the 
AIM-9X missile to the target of interest when it is beyond the view of the aircraft‘s heads-up display. Using the radar 
to cue the missile, however, will take more time and be less certain than with the helmet and will require DOD to 
train pilots in yet to be developed procedures and tactics that would be considerably different than current practices 





A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Technical reports were drawn from 1970 to 2011.  By decade, the frequency of 
reports is presented in Table 3.  There was a relatively even distribution of the publication 
dates across the four decades which we examined. 
 
Table 3.  Distribution of technical reports by decade 
 
Decade Percentage of Reports 
1970 – 1979   25% 
1980 – 1989   30% 
1990 – 1999 23% 
2000 – 2011 22% 
 
The distribution of reports by Service is presented in Table 4.  The reports were 
approximately evenly distributed.  Since the Navy and Marine Corps have a common 
acquisition authority, they were aggregated. 
 
Table 4.  Distribution of technical reports by decade 
 
Service Percentage of 
Reports 
Army 37% 
Navy & Marine Corps 33% 
Air Force 30% 
 
The systems that were examined in this review are listed in Table 5, along with 
the year(s) of the report in which the system was examined.  Each system listed below 

















Table 5.  Systems reported in the literature searches 
 
System Year System Year 
A-7 1976 AIM-9X      
(Sidewinder) 
1998 
P-3C 1977 FBCB2 1998 
T-37 1978 JCCS 1998 
AC-130E 1978 MILSTAR 1998 
CH-47 1979 Javelin 1998, 1999 
AH-1 1980 F-22 1994,  1999,  2004       
H-3, SH-3 1981 V-22 2001 
F-111 1982 KC-135 2004, 2010 
C-130 1982 JSF 2004 
F-16 1987 LCS 2004 
FAADS 1990 Longbow 2006 
B-2 1993, 1997 Patriot 2007 
AH-64 1994 Predator 2009 
JSTARS 1996 Global Hawk 2009 
THAAD 1996, 1999 Reaper 2009 
JPATS 1997, 2003   
 
B. ANALYSIS OF GAPS 
In a speech that was in the Congressional Record dated October 1, 1997, 
Representative Ike Skelton shared with his colleagues his views on the successes of the 
MANPRINT program.  He pointed to notable MANPRINT assessments that led to 
operational improvements, such as the reduction in tools for a Comanche helicopter T-
800 engine from 134 to only 6.  In an example in which MANPRINT considerations were 
not incorporated and in fact purposely rejected, according to the Army Audit Agency, the 
Armored Gun System was cancelled prior to its being fielded for several reasons 
including HSI factors.  Booher (1990) provides additional examples from the 1980s.   
Such problems occurred when human performance assessments were either not done or 
done too late to have an impact on the system design process.  Representative Skelton 
argued that MANPRINT domains, of which training is one, were not being integrated in 
the acquisition process on a continuous basis.  There were gaps between a hoped-for 
potential status versus an actual existing status at critical times in the acquisition cycle. 
The gap analysis in this study examines differences in the existing status of 
training for a system as reflected in a published report and the potential of what could 
have been the desired state if training plans or training execution had been done more 
efficiently or effectively.  It is easy, certainly, to look back at a consequential fault and 
recommend an ―if only they had done this or considered that.‖  We cannot, of course, 
judge with certainty if alternatives were considered or plans were reduced for a variety of 
reasons, many of them may have seemed reasonable at the time.  What we can do is 
detect and classify a pattern of gaps that highlight the importance of early design of 
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training and well-planned training programs and what the consequences can be if training 
is not fully integrated throughout the acquisition.  There is a degree of supposition on our 
part as to the causes of why these gaps materialized, so we can go no further than offering 
a professional appraisal based on our working experience in the field.  That these gaps 
persist is reason to explore the problem area, and seek relief through policy change and 
educating the acquisition and industrial workforces.  Future work can consider 
extensions, deeper fact-finding approaches, or case study methods to understand the issue 
and its antecedent causes in greater depth and with greater accuracy. 
Four categories of gaps were identified earlier.  For each gap, we supply instances 
and examples drawn from the database.   This example serves to suggest this 
methodology as a way to explore further questions surrounding the value of training early 
in an acquisition program.  The results are organized by the type of gap, which was 
determined based on a comparison of a training consequence from a GAO record with 
one or more findings in the technical database, a summary statement of the consequence, 
and a record number.  The record number refers to the database locator.  A listing of 
database entries and abstracts is provided in Appendix C, with the technical entries listed 
chronologically and the GAO entries listed in order of entry. 
Knowledge Gap – a best training practice has not been fully validated or proven 
for application for a given training system 
 
 Training in a Navy aviation logistics system was augmented by word-of-mouth 
training due to a lack of proper technical documentation and availability of 
manuals, raising costs and resulting in an instance of a knowledge gap (record 
516, 1990). 
 
 Insufficient estimates for supporting costs related to training, particularly 
maintenance training, appears to have resulted from a lacking front end analysis, 
resulting in a knowledge gap (record 506, 1993). 
 
 Pilot training for the Predator advanced concept technology demonstration was 
found to be deficient since the demonstration was not designed to do so, an 
example of a knowledge gap (record 504, 1998). 
 
Awareness Gap – a best training practice is a proven and established method, but 
has not been applied for the training system of interest. 
 
 Insufficient front end analysis  for special operations aircrew training led to a 
schedule slippage, resulting in an instance of an awareness gap (record 519, 
1992). 
 
 Training targeting using the radar to cue a missile, rather than using a helmet-
mounted cueing system, requires training in procedures and tactics that have not 
yet been developed, despite training methods capable of delivering such 
instruction, resulting in an awareness gap (record 503, 1998). 
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 Operator training for a command and control system was found to be inadequate, 
despite successes with training such skills in the technology base, resulting in an 
awareness gap (record 510, 1998). 
 
 The training of gunners for the Javelin antitank weapon limits the weapons 
capabilities, notably due to training software that will not teach gunners to 
recognize moving targets or properly train identification and recognition of 
thermal images, resulting in an awareness gap (record 511, 1998). 
 
 Training shortfall led to shipboard operators performing manual tuning of radio 
frequencies without prior training due to reliability issues, resulting in an 
awareness gap (record 527, 2001). 
 
 Lack of synchronization between needed training capabilities, particularly the 
information management of training, and production decisions in primary aircraft 
training system resulted in an awareness gap (record 530, 2003). 
 
 The availability of F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft for training (or 
combat) use can be diminished without improvements in reliability, resulting in 
an awareness gap (record 532, 2004). 
 
 Inadequate front end analysis reduced the availability of refueling aircraft for the 
Navy due to a lower priority placed by the Air Force, resulting in an awareness 
gap (record 533, 2004). 
 
 A weak cost estimate for training due in part to new operational concepts for 
multi-skilled sailors to operate and maintain the Littoral Combat Ship resulted in 
an awareness gap (record 535, 2010). 
 
Implementation Gap – a valid best training practice has been identified and 
attempted, but did not work in the case of a given training system. 
 
 Aircraft are not fully available for crew training, so not planning sufficient 
aircraft, simulators, or part task trainers for training purposes through better front-
end planning limits operational effectiveness, resulting in an instance of an 
implementation gap (record 501, 1997). 
 
 Training requirements may be able to be met with a smaller quantity of primary 
aircraft training system, which appears not to be following a proper economical 
approach during early analysis, resulting in an implementation gap (record 505, 
1997). 
 
 Inadequate collective training for units contributed to an inadequate experiment 
related to operational testing of battle command system, which may have resulted 
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from an inadequate front end analysis of levels-of-training needed for testing, 
resulting in an implementation gap (record 508, 1998). 
 
 Changes resulting from upgrades to communication satellites required a 
reconfiguration of software and a retraining of operators; a more inclusive front 
end analysis could have better modularized the training and reduced the retrain 
requirements, resulting in an implementation gap (record 514, 1998). 
 
 An adjustment in the number and model type of end items to be acquired (fighter 
jets) resulted in a greater percentage of trainer aircraft, with less capability, as part 
of the total buy.  Expanding the use of simulation and simulators may have been 
able to mitigate this, resulting in an implementation gap (record 509, 1999). 
 
 A change to the Javelin system‘s launch unit resulted in requiring personnel to be 
trained for two configurations, an example of training not keeping up with 
engineering changes in the system, resulting in an implementation gap (record 
512, 1999). 
 
 Inadequate training of shipboard technicians resulted in an implementation gap 
(record 524, 2000). 
 
 Inadequate front end analysis in several tactical aircraft acquisitions translates to 
fewer aircraft being available for training (record 529, 2001). 
 
 Win-T (record 534, 2011). 
 
Commitment Gap – a valid best training practice is recognized but not applied 
due to policy, cost, schedule or other factors. 
 
 A general issue raised was a practice of program sponsors maintaining low cost 
estimates by excluding costs such as costs of training equipment, resulting in an 
instance of a commitment gap (record 517, record 521 1992). 
 
 Shortfalls in operator training for the Joint Stars Ground Station caused problems 
during operational testing, many later isolated to software fixes resulting in a 
commitment gap (record 513, 1996). 
 
 Additional training is needed to improve anti submarine warfare crew proficiency, 
so training resources were insufficient or not properly committed in view of other 
priorities, resulting in a commitment gap (record 502, 1999). 
 
 Potential over reliance on contractor personnel in general may reduce rotational 
positions to meet training requirements in logistics support areas, resulting in a 
commitment gap (record 525, 2000). 
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 In February 2010 the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the 
significant cost growth threshold, which it attributed to factors such as the 
omission of training devices and adequate spares from initial estimates, and 
delays in the production decision. (record 534, 2011). 
 
Twenty six gaps were uncovered based on judgments of training analysts 
involved in the study.  Undoubtedly, many more could be identified with a more 
thorough analysis and other source materials from operational testing results.  The 
breakout of type of gap by category is presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.  Percentage of cases for each of the gaps studied 
 
 Percentage 
Knowledge Gap 11% 
Awareness Gap 35% 
Implementation Gap 35% 
Commitment Gap 19% 
 
C. CROSSWALK WITH TECHNICAL REPORT DATABASE 
The thrust of this analysis is to determine the extent to which there was pre-
existing knowledge in the technology base that could have potentially alleviated or even 
eliminated the gap.  In each case of the gaps identified, information in the Technical 
Report portion of the database indicated the availability of one or more documents that 
preceded the documented circumstance and could have potentially circumvented the gap, 
at least in a notional way without deeper study of the details.  For example, the awareness 
gap identified as insufficient estimates for supporting costs related to training, 
particularly maintenance training, appears to have resulted from a lacking front end 
analysis (record 506, 1993) could have potentially been remediated by applying the 
knowledge gained in an Air Force report, or follow on work, describing a methodology 
which is useful for applying human resources, logistics, and cost factors in weapon 
system acquisition programs. The methodology, termed the coordinated human resources 
technology (CHRT), was developed from an integration of five individual human 
resources technologies: maintenance manpower modeling, instructional system 
development, job guide development, human resources in design tradeoffs, and system 
ownership costing (record 30, 1980). 
 
D. FRONT END ANALYSIS AND GAPS 
 The Defense acquisition process consists of the phases and milestones 
described in earlier paragraphs.  During the early or  ―front end‖ of the acquisition 
process, the Concept Refinement Phase, incorporates detailed analysis including an 
analysis of alternatives to assess various materiel, software, and technologies solutions to 
shape capabilities to best meet the military operational requirements.  A recent topic of 
discussion in Defense Leadership meetings has been the need for more rigorous 
assessments in the earliest stages of the acquisition process can be most productive in 
effectively and efficiently meeting the warfighter needs.  It is further believed that early 
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incorporation of system training details in the pre-milestone A analysis has great benefit 
in achieving the best possible system solution and can positively impact each stage of the 
acquisition life cycle.  Particularly those systems with significant human interface 
requirements are found to benefit from bringing in training systems planning in the 
concept refinement process in a series of iterations with the end users.  Early systems 
prototypes (constructive or virtual simulations) for instance can be a very effective tool in 
narrowing down and shaping the final desired capability with the warfighters.  The use of 
modeling and simulation and incorporation of a systems engineering approach to systems 
training can logically drive the future system training tools, simulators and part-task 
trainers, as appropriate.  In major acquisition programs the ability to insert training early 
in the program can help shape the final quantities and technical complexity of the end 
capability.  From a senior DoD management perspective, proper front end analysis to 
include the systems training considerations can permit a go or no-go decision and/or 
justify significant modifications prior to the commitment of large, long-term fiscal 
resources. 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Representative Skelton, in his speech to Congress referenced earlier, stated  ‗it 
seemed that whenever a new system was put into the hands of the soldier, actual field 
performance often failed to match the standards predicted during its development.‘  What 
went wrong with the acquisition?  This report defined a potential acquisition concern – 
slow or poor integration of training during weapon system development, proposed 
methodologies needed to examine further issues surrounding training system integration.  
The study reviewed selected documents that reveal that the direction of training R&D, the 
status of training practices, and shortcomings in systems being acquired by DoD running 
from the early 1970s to early 2011.  The review of technical reports focused primarily on 
determining the training effectiveness of specific training systems as related to 
technological and methodological concerns, while the other reports highlighted training-
related issues identified primarily during developmental and operational testing. 
There were thousands of reports to choose from, so a systematic sample was 
selected from the technical side given the resource limitations of the study.  The reports 
related to training issues for specific systems were more complete over a twenty year 
span.  Given the particular sample of reports reviewed here, we cannot fully judge the 
impact of late, or inadequate training support for a given weapon system, nor can we 
make the general case relating training development timing and weapon system mission 
readiness and operational effectives. However, we suspect that further inquiry into the 
subject, with additional source materials and the inclusion of complementary methods 
such as case study and archival document content analysis would be productive and 
bringing us closer to answering the stated research questions regarding the impact of 
early training system development on weapon system acquisition and deployment. 
It is therefore suggested that further investigation continue, using the database 
formulated during this study as a point of departure. Also, it is believed that the study 
methodology should consider incorporating systematic case study analysis (Yin, 1997) to 
identify program outcomes (successful and unsuccessful) for benchmarking and 
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establishing a final Lessons Learned Database.  A transition to a second phase is 
warranted. 
The development of training early in the acquisition can have other, unexpected 
benefits.  For example, in developing the Army‘s future forward air defense system, 
analysts discovered what training revealed – that the projected air threat could strike 
ground forces from a distance beyond the range of the missile system.  The Secretary of 
Defense cancelled the DIVAD program in 1985. 
Top management within the Department of Defense has taken steps in an attempt 
to make the acquisition process more disciplined, and it has redefined the basic strategy 
for acquiring weapons.  For example, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) is the current DoD procedure which defines acquisition requirements 
and evaluation criteria.  It replaces the previous service-specific requirements systems, 
which focused on addressing future threat scenarios.  New acquisition programs were not 
considered in the context of other programs, such as would be the case in a system-of-
systems approach.  These previous practices created redundancies in capabilities and 
failed to meet the combined needs of all the Services. JCIDS guides the development of 
requirements for future acquisition systems to reflect the needs of all four services.  The 
central theme is to address capability shortfalls, or gaps as defined by combatant 
commanders. Thus, JCIDS is said to provide a capabilities-based approach to 
requirements generation.  
The reform of the acquisition process seeks to advance technology while holding 
down procurement costs.  Better training of the acquisition workforce, tighter monitoring 
of contractor performance, and the availability of tools for those involved in acquisition 
all contribute to reform activities.  As an example of an overarching tool, the basic 
concepts of the Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) program formed a decade ago are 
still viable – but largely unachieved today.  The SBA vision encompassed an acquisition 
process in which the DoD and industry partners are enabled by the robust, collaborative 
use of simulation technology integrated across all acquisition phases and programs.  The 
goals of SBA are still in sync and consistent with the current acquisition reform policy 
initiatives.   
 Reduce time, resources, and risk associated with the entire acquisition process 
 Increase the quality, military worth and supportability of fielded systems 
 Reduce total ownership costs throughout the system life cycle, and  
 Enable integrated product and process development across the entire acquisition 
life cycle 
 
In keeping with the SBA vision and goals, the Department can provide a systems 
engineering environment that emphasizes modeling and simulation (M&S) as a primary 
analysis tool and fosters the use and reuse of data and M&S content across programs and 
phases.  It is envisioned that use of models can refine the needs and provide the 
underpinning for more rigorous analyses prior to Milestone A, while transitioning critical 
content to guide systems design and later development and production processes. 
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From the early requirements and conceptualization stages, the use of M&S and in 
particular system prototyping provides a powerful analytic capability to meet user needs.  
It has been argued that prototypes are platforms for productive participation, as well as 
for perfecting products and performance.  The power of producing systems prototypes 
early in the process serves as a way to iterate feedback from and dialogue with the end 
user to arrive at better systems and solutions for the operational needs.  The more obvious 
use of prototypes is to guide the engineering analysis in the development planning stage 
of the acquisition.  Many firms can be found proposing services to industry in the area of 
model building and prototyping and are highly successful in providing rapid prototyping 
services that encompass proof of concept and proof of design with functional working 
simulations and models.  The use of prototyping can encompass constructive simulations, 
virtual environments or physical mock ups of the end system or product.  With the use of 
such tools as 3D visualization one can progress to ―model making‖ to influence the 
construct of actual 3D models.  The area of rapid prototyping uses state of the art 
CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and computer-aided machining or modeling) 
techniques.   Significant advances in the area of M&S make it now more important than 
ever that we incorporate oversight directives to include contracting language that require 
the use of simulations, models and prototypes in all phases of the acquisition process. 
 
Another example of an acquisition workforce tool is the Improved Performance Research 
Integration Tool, or IMPRINT.  Developed by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, 
Human Research and Engineering Directorate, IMPRINT is a network modeling tools 
that factors in people-driven constraints on system design, evaluating the capability of 
operators and maintainers to gain optimal performance from a system under 
environmental stressors.  The IMPRINT Pro tool, available free of charge for U.S. 
government agencies and industry under contract to the U.S government, now has the 
capability to examine missions and systems from the Services and Joint commands. 
 
During the last decade the Department has initiated programs such as ―lean six 
sigma‖ and ―streamlining acquisition‖ to make the acquisition process more effective as 
well as more efficient.  Today there seems to be a growing consensus that more rigorous 
analysis should be included in acquisition, and especially in the early phases of the 
process. Consistent with these approach training systems considerations should be 
included in the requirements, concept definition and refinement phases of the process.  
Early in his administration, President Obama announced acquisition reform goals and 
policies and outlined actions that impact government procurement, acquisition programs 
and contractors in a wide variety of areas.   The convergence of new administration 
priorities, burgeoning costs, and outdated procurement processes prompted a series of 
major contracting and policy initiatives designed to: 
 
 Develop more agile acquisition processes to increase the speed of technology 
deployment  
 Increase transparency of the acquisition process  
 Institute stricter risk and performance parameters  
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 Reduce costs through cuts in contractor spending and use of ―high-risk‖ 
contract types  
At the International Training Equipment Conference (ITEC) held May 10-12, 
2011 in Cologne German, Director of Training Readiness and Strategy in the office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness again expressed the belief, from the 
training community, that acquisition practices, particularly in the modeling and 
simulation area, have not kept pace with technology advances.  He went on to say, “We 
have an Industrial Age approach to acquisition, and we are in an e-commerce 
environment.”  In today‘s e-commerce environment there is an opportunity to track 
customer preferences and look at demand from the user community in real time. As part 
of his ITEC presentation the Director, TRS appealed to the military to adopt more 
training tools that can customize content to the user by understanding their learning style 
and allowing them to progress at a more natural pace.  He appealed industry to embrace a 
new business model and to recognize training includes the soft skills found in today‘s full 
spectrum operations to maximize human performance potential. 
 
 
A. CLOSING COMMENTS 
The DoD spends billions of dollars each year developing and procuring major 
weapon systems.  These expenditures have produced the most technologically advanced 
weapon systems.  Nevertheless, the process through which systems are determined and 
acquired has often proved costly and inefficient, as hundreds of reports by the DoD 
Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office have repeatedly reported.  
Cost and schedule can be overly optimistic, leading to instability and cost increases in the 
long run.  Powerful incentives and interests can influence the behaviors of those 
involved, including DoD components, industry, and Congress.  More funds may be made 
available for training and other human system considerations through a reduction of 
inefficiencies without necessarily adding to baseline costs.  Early consideration of 
training can have clear benefits in reducing certain problems that have been documented 
in weapon system acquisition. 
 
The Phase I effort provides a relatively extensive list of reports and studies 
relating to training systems acquisition in MDAP programs.  The automated data base 
with common variables provides ready access to details from several hundred program 
documents.  The gap and trend analysis of this data has provided a start point for the 
Phase II study which will examine a series of selected systems (by type and category) for 
detailed assessment through case studies.  During Phase II the database of historic 
examples will be extended, as appropriate, to flesh out the selected case studies.  For each 
system chosen, specific metric will be developed to assess the early and effective system 
training practices in acquisition.  The selection of both common and system specific 
metrics will allow the research team to determine trends within and between program 
categories – and longitudinally across the past 20 or more years.  The objective of the 
Phase II study is to determine / demonstrate the value added from early and effective 
system training practices and the life cycle benefits to detailed and rigorous insertion of 
system training details early on, and continuously in all phases the acquisition process. 
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Training Systems Study - Discussion
Phase I
• Initial Study Phase
– Determine variables of study
– Identify sources of technical 
documents
• Execution Phase
– Assemble and code documents
– Populate database
• Analysis Phase (in process)
– Analyze database for relationships 
& trends
– Identify gaps and shortcomings
5/26/2011 15
Phase II
• Extend Phase I database for historic 
examples
• Determine specific metrics for assessing 
early and effective system training practices 
in acquisition
• Select systems for case study
- Assess the impact of early and 
effective system training practices
- Determine trends within and 
between program categories
Demonstrate value added from early and 
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POLICY AND GUIDANCE EXCERPTS 
 
The following are excerpts of policy and guidance for development of training 
capabilities associated with acquisition programs. It was noted that the requirement to 
develop training systems plans (TSP) in DoDI 5000.02 does not specify by what point in 
the acquisition process these plans should be developed. Requiring submission of the 
TSPs early in program development would facilitate improved effectiveness of the 
training systems provided. 
DoDI 5000.02 (Operation of the Defense Acquisition System)  
8. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT PHASE 
a. Purpose. The purpose of the Operations and Support Phase is to execute a 
support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance 
requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life 
cycle. Planning for this phase shall begin prior to program initiation and shall be 
documented in the LCSP. Operations and Support has two major efforts, Life-Cycle 
Sustainment and Disposal. The DoDI requires that Program Managers do the following in 
support for sustainment of the system: 
(c) Effective sustainment of systems results from the design and development of 
reliable and maintainable systems through the continuous application of a robust systems 
engineering methodology. 
2. Optimize operational readiness via: 
a. Human-factors engineering to design systems that require minimal manpower; 
provide effective training; can be operated and maintained by users; and are suitable 
(habitable and safe with minimal environmental and occupational health hazards) and 
survivable (for both the crew and equipment). 
b. Diagnostics, prognostics, and health management techniques in embedded and 
off-equipment applications when feasible and cost-effective (Reference (o));  
c. Embedded training and testing, with a preference for approved DoD Automatic 
Test Systems (ATS) Families to satisfy ATS requirements; 
d. Serialized item management techniques and the use of automatic identification 
technology (AIT), radio-frequency identification, and iterative technology refreshment. 
PMs shall ensure that data syntax and semantics for high-capacity AIT devices conform 
to International Organization for Standardization ISO 15418 and ISO 15434 (References 
(t) and (u)). 
 
from ENCLOSURE 7: RESOURCE ESTIMATION 
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5. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES PROCEDURES. For potential and 
designated ACAT I and IA programs, the DPA&E shall draft, for MDA approval, AoA 
study guidance for review at the Materiel Development Decision. Following approval, 
the guidance shall be issued to the DoD Component designated by the MDA, or for 
ACAT IA programs, to the office of the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for the 
mission area. The DoD Component or the Principal Staff Assistant shall designate 
responsibility for completion of the study plan and the AoA; neither of which may be 
assigned to the PM. The study plan shall be coordinated with the MDA and approved by 
the DPA&E prior to the start of the AoA. The final AoA shall be provided to the DPA&E 
not later than 60 days prior to the DAB or ITAB milestone reviews. The DPA&E shall 
evaluate the AoA and provide an assessment to the Head of the DoD Component or 
Principal Staff Assistant and to the MDA. In this evaluation, the DPA&E, in 
collaboration with the OSD and Joint Staff, shall assess the extent to which the AoA: 
a. Illuminated capability advantages and disadvantages; 
b. Considered joint operational plans; 
c. Examined sufficient feasible alternatives; 
d. Discussed key assumptions and variables and sensitivity to changes in these; 
e. Calculated costs; and, 
f. Assessed the following: 
(1) Technology risk and maturity; 
(2) Alternative ways to improve the energy efficiency of DoD tactical systems 
with end items that create a demand for energy, consistent with mission requirements and 
cost effectiveness; and 
(3) Appropriate system training to ensure that effective and efficient training is 
provided with the system. 
 
from ENCLOSURE 8: HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
1. GENERAL. The PM shall have a plan for HSI in place early in the acquisition 
process to optimize total system performance, minimize total ownership costs, and ensure 
that the system is built to accommodate the characteristics of the user population that will 
operate, maintain, and support the system. 
2. HSI PLANNING. HSI planning shall be summarized in the Acquisition 
Strategy and SEP and shall address the following: 
e. Training. The PM shall work with the training community to develop options 
for individual, collective, and joint training for operators, maintainers and support 
personnel, and, where appropriate, base training decisions on training effectiveness 
evaluations. The PM shall address the major elements of training, and place special 
emphasis on options that enhance user capabilities, maintain skill proficiencies, and 
reduce individual and collective training costs. The PM shall develop training system 
plans to maximize the use of new learning techniques, simulation technology, embedded 
training and distributed learning (DoD Instruction 1322.26 (Reference (be))), and 
instrumentation systems that provide ―anytime, anyplace‖ training and reduce the 
demand on the training establishment. Where possible, the PM shall maximize the use of 
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simulation-supported embedded training, and the training systems shall fully support and 
mirror the interoperability of the operational system (DoD Directive 1322.18 (Reference 
(bf))). 
 
DoDD 1322.18: Military Training 
4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that: 
a. Individual, staff, and collective military training programs funded by the 
Department of Defense shall be available to Active and Reserve Component personnel, 
civilian employees and, when authorized, to contractors, allies, and other U.S. 
Government or non-Government agency personnel. 
b. Military training to generate and sustain capabilities required by the CCDRs 
and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Concept (Reference (b)) shall encompass all 
phases of joint campaigns and the full range of integrated operations. 
c. Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent 
possible, timely and effective individual, collective, and staff training, conducted in a safe 
manner, to enable performance to standard during operations. 
d. The Department of Defense shall maintain a comprehensive and effective 
Service, Defense Agency, and joint training management capability to develop, execute, 
and assess military training throughout the Department. 
e. Training capabilities shall be based on a DoD training architecture and an open, 
net-centric, interoperable standard. 
f. Embedded training and development of net-centric training capabilities shall be 
considered as the first alternative for cost-effective delivery of instruction and training. 
 
DoDI 1322.26: Development, Management, and Delivery of Distributed 
Learning 
4. POLICY  
It is DoD policy that:  
4.1. Embedded training and distributed learning shall be considered as the first 
option to meet training requirements of defense technology projects and acquisition 
programs (Reference (a)). 
Acquisition Guide Book 
3.4.2.1. Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) 
System support concept 
 System logistics concept 
 Hardware maintenance and support concept 
 Software support concept 
 System training concept 
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It also is important that the analytic approach to the cost estimate be documented 
and reviewed by all potentially interested parties, before the actual work on preparing the 
cost estimate begins. This helps ensure that there are no false starts or misunderstandings 
later in the process. Normally, cost estimates are sponsored by a system program office 
and are prepared by a multi-disciplinary team with functional skills in financial 
management, logistics, engineering, and other talents. The team also should include 
participants or reviewers from major affected organizations, such as the system‘s 
operating command, product support center, maintenance depot, training center or 
command, and so forth. Typically, the analytic approach to the cost estimate has a written 
study plan that includes a master schedule (of specific tasks, responsible parties, and due 
dates). For sufficiently complex efforts, the estimating team may be organized as a 
formal Integrated Product Team (IPT). For independent cost estimates, the team may be 
smaller and less formal, but the basic principle—complete coordination of the analytic 
approach with all interested parties—still applies. 
4.3.1.3.1. Interpret User Needs; Analyze Operational Capabilities and 
Environmental Constraints 
This step includes the aggregation of all inputs available at this stage of the 
program (Initial Capabilities Document, Analysis of Alternatives Plan, exit criteria for 
the phase, concept alternatives for overall tactical system, as well as associated support 
system, training system, and interoperable systems). 
4.3.1.3.3. Decompose Concept Performance into Functional Definition and 
Verification Objectives 
This step includes the further decomposition of concept system performance to 
the functional level. Consideration should be given to inclusion of functionality and 
functional flow definition across the full system concept (tactical system, support system, 
training system) and how this functionality relates to other interoperable systems 
(functional interfaces). Critical to this analysis is an understanding of the level of 
functionality achievable within program constraints and risk. Trade space and risk should 
be analyzed and assessed against desired functional performance. Trade offs are made to 
stay within program constraints and may require changes to higher-level system or 
concept definitions. 
4.3.2.3.1. Interpret User Needs; Analyze Operational Capabilities and 
Environmental Constraints 
This step includes the aggregation of all inputs available at this stage of the 
program (Initial Capabilities Document, draft Capability Development Document, results 
of the Analysis of Alternatives and identification of the preferred system concept, exit 
criteria for the phase, Systems Engineering Plan, Technology Development Strategy, Test 
and Evaluation Strategy, as well as associated support and maintenance concepts and 
technologies, training system, and interoperable systems). 
4.3.2.3.3. Develop Functional Definitions for Enabling/Critical Technologies and 
Associated Verification Plan 
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This step requires the further decomposition of system performance to the 
functional level. The functional requirements should be evaluated against available 
technologies, such that enabling and/or critical technologies can be defined. 
Consideration should be given to inclusion of functionality and functional flow definition 
across the full system (tactical system, support system, training system) and how this 
functionality relates to other interoperable systems (functional interfaces). Critical to this 
analysis is an understanding of the level of functionality achievable within the program 
constraints and program risk. Trade space and risk should be analyzed and assessed 
against desired functional performance. Trade-offs may be required to stay within 
program constraints and may require changes to higher-level system definitions. 
4.3.3.4.4. Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
The PDR is a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that the system under 
review can proceed into detailed design, and can meet the stated performance 
requirements within cost (program budget), schedule (program schedule), risk, and other 
system constraints. Generally, this review assesses the system preliminary design as 
captured in performance specifications for each configuration item in the system 
(allocated baseline), and ensures that each function in the functional baseline has been 
allocated to one or more system configuration items. Configuration items may consist of 
hardware and software elements and include such items as airframes, avionics, weapons, 
crew systems, engines, trainers/training, etc. 
6.2.3 Training 
6.2.3.1 Training Overview 
Training is the learning process by which personnel individually or collectively 
acquire or enhance predetermined job-relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities by 
developing their cognitive, physical, sensory, and team dynamic abilities. The 
"training/instructional system" integrates training concepts and strategies and elements of 
logistic support to satisfy personnel performance levels required to operate, maintain, and 
support the systems. It includes the "tools" used to provide learning experiences such as 
computer-based interactive courseware, simulators, and actual equipment (including 
embedded training capabilities on actual equipment), job performance aids, and 
Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals. 
6.2.3.2 Training Parameters/Requirements 
When developing the training/instructional system, the program manager should 
employ transformational training concepts, strategies, and tools such as computer based 
and interactive courseware, simulators, and embedded training consistent with the 
strategy, goals and objectives of the Training Transformation Strategic Plan (March 1, 
2002) and the Training Transformation Implementation Plan and Appendix 1 (June 
2004). The Departments vision for raining Transformation is to provide dynamic, 
capabilities-based training in support of national security requirements across the full 
spectrum of Service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. 
This new approach emphasizes the mission requirements of the combatant commanders 
(COCOM). The COCOM is the customer. The intent is to design systems and structure 
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acquisition programs focused on the training needs of the COCOM. The desired outcome 
is to fully support COCOM requirements, missions, and capabilities, while preserving the 
ability of the DoD Components to train for their core competencies. The Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, as a member of the Defense Acquisition Board, 
assesses the ability of the acquisition program to support the Military Departments, 
COCOMs, and DoD Components. "Training," in this context, includes training, 
education, and job-performance aiding. Joint training must be able to support a broad 
range of roles and responsibilities in military, multinational, interagency, and 
intergovernmental contexts, and the Department of Defense must provide such training to 
be truly flexible and operationally effective. Training readiness will be assessed and 
reported, not only in the traditional joint context, but also in view of this broader range of 
"joint" operations. Joint training and education will be recast as components of lifelong 
learning and made available to the Total Force-active, reserve, and DoD civilians. The 
Department will expand efforts to develop officers well versed in joint operational art. 
The interfaces between training systems and the acquisition process will be strengthened. 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, as a member of the 
Defense Acquisition Board, assesses an acquisition program's ability to support the 
Combatant Commander's and DoD Components' capabilities to provide HSI as an 
integral part of an acquisition program. 
The program manager should summarize major elements of the training plan in 
the Support Strategy. This should include logistics support planning for training, training 
equipment and training device acquisitions and installations. 
A Special Note on Embedded Training. Both the sponsor and the program 
manager should give careful consideration and priority to the use of embedded training as 
defined in DoD Directive 1322.18: ―Capabilities built into, strapped onto, or plugged into 
operational materiel systems to train, sustain, and enhance individual and crew skill 
proficiencies necessary to operate and maintain the equipment.‖ The sponsor‘s decisions 
to use embedded training should be made very early in the capabilities determination 
process. Analysis should be conducted to compare the embedded training with more 
traditional training media (e.g., simulator based training, traditional classroom 
instruction, and/or maneuver training) for consideration of a system‘s Total Operating 
Cost. The analysis should compare the costs and the impact of embedded training (e.g., 
training operators and maintenance personnel on site compared to off station travel to a 
temporary duty location for training). It should also compare the learning time and level 
of effectiveness (e.g., higher ―kill‖ rates and improved maintenance times) achieved by 
embedded training. When making decisions about whether to rely exclusively on 
embedded training, analysis must be conducted to determine the timely availability of 
new equipment to all categories of trainees (e.g., Reserve and Active Component units or 
individual members). For instance, a National Guard tank battalion that stores and 
maintains its tanks at a central maintenance/training facility may find it more cost 
effective to rely on mobile simulator assets to train combat tasks rather than transporting 
its troops to the training facility during drill weekends. A job aid for embedded training 
costing and effectiveness analyses is: ―A Guide for Early Embedded Training Decisions,‖ 
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Product 
96-06. 
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6.2.3.3 Training Planning 
This section will prepare the Program Manager to understand training capabilities 
as an integral part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and, 
with assistance of the training community, translate those capabilities into system design 
features.  
First, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process should 
address joint training parameters for military (Active, Reserve, and Guard) and civilian 
personnel who will operate, maintain, and support the system. Training programs should 
employ a cost-effective solution, consisting of a blend of capabilities that use existing 
training programs and introduces new performance-based training innovations. This may 
include requirements for school and unit training, as well as new equipment training, or 
sustainment training. This also may include requirements for instructor and key personnel 
training and new equipment training teams.  
Training should be considered early in the capabilities development process 
beginning with the analyses that supports development of the Initial Capabilities 
Document and continues with development of the Capability Development Document. 
The Capability Development Document should discuss the specific system 
training requirements: 
 Allow for interactions between platforms or units (e.g., through advanced 
simulation and virtual exercises) and provide training realism to include threats 
(e.g., virtual and surrogate), a realistic electronic warfare environment, 
communications, and weapons. 
 Embedded training capabilities that do not degrade system performance below 
threshold values nor degrade the maintainability or component life of the system. 
 That Initial Operational Capability is attained and that training capabilities are 
embedded and met by Initial Operational Capability. 
 An embedded performance measurement capability to support immediate 
feedback to the operators/maintainers and possibly to serve as a readiness 
measure for the unit commander. 
 Training logistics necessary to support the training concept(e.g., requirements for 
new or upgrades to existing training facilities). 
 The training community should be specific in translating capabilities into system 
requirements. They should also set training resource constraints. Examples are: 
 The training community should consider whether the system be designed with a 
mode of operation that allows operators to train interactively on a continuous 
basis, even when deployed in remote locations. 
 The training community should consider whether the system be capable of 
exhibiting fault conditions for a specified set of failures to allow rehearsal of 
repair procedures for isolating faults or require that the system be capable of 
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interconnecting with other (specific) embedded trainers in both static and 
employed conditions. 
 The training community should consider whether embedded training capabilities 
allow enhancements to live maneuver such that a realistic spectrum of threats is 
encountered (e.g., synthetic radar warnings generated during flight). 
 The training community should consider whether the integrated training system 
be fully tested, validated, verified, and ready for training at the training base as 
criteria for declaring Initial Operational Capability. 
 From the earliest stages of development and as the system matures, the program 
manager should emphasize training requirements that enhance the user‘s 
capabilities, improve readiness, and reduce individual and collective training costs 
over the life of the system. This may include requirements for expert systems, 
intelligent tutors, embedded diagnostics, virtual environments, and embedded 
training capabilities. Examples of training that enhances user‘s capabilities 
follow: 
 Interactive electronic technical manuals provide a training forum that can 
significantly reduce schoolhouse training and may require lower skill levels for 
maintenance personnel while actually improving their capability to maintain an 
operational system; 
 Requirements for an embedded just-in-time mission rehearsal capability 
supported by the latest intelligence information and an integrated global training 
system/network that allows team training and participation in large scale mission 
rehearsal exercises can be used to improve readiness. 
 In all cases, the paramount goal of the training/instructional system should be to 
develop and sustain a ready, well-trained individual/unit, while giving strong 
consideration to options that can reduce Life-cycle costs and provide positive 
contributions to the joint context of a system, where appropriate. 
 Training devices and simulators are systems that, in some cases, may qualify for 
their own set of HSI requirements. For instance, the training community may 
require the following attributes of a training simulator: 
 Accommodate ―the central 90 percent of the male and female population on 
critical body dimensions;‖ 
 Not increase manpower requirements and should consider reductions in 
manpower requirements; 
 Consider reduced skill sets to maintain because of embedded instrumentation; 
 Be High Level Architecture compliant; 
 Be Sharable Content Object Reference Model compliant; 
 Be Test and Training Enabling Architecture compliant; 
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 Use reusable simulation objects. 
 
CJCSI 3170.01G: JCIDS 
2. Introduction to the JCIDS Process 
e. During the Technology Development phase (Figure A-4), the sponsor performs 
technology maturation activities, builds competitive prototypes, and may perform design 
activities leading to a preliminary design review. The ICD provides a wide aperture for 
operational capability to define system requirements and to encourage technological 
innovation. It is vital the science and technology, users, training, and system developer 
communities collaborate to agree on a proposed solution that is affordable, militarily 
useful, and based on mature, demonstrated technology. 
JCIDS Manual 
d. Selectively Applied KPPs. The JROC has defined two KPPs to be selectively 
applied to programs: system training and energy efficiency. The sponsor will perform an 
analysis on the use of these parameters as KPPs. If the analysis determines that they 
should not be KPPs, a summary of the justification will be provided in the CDD. 
(1) System Training KPP. Training should be considered early in the capabilities 
development process beginning with the analyses that support development of the ICD 
and continues with development of the CDD. Ensure system training is addressed in the 
AoA and supporting analysis for subsequent acquisition phases and ensure projected 
training requirements and associated costs are appropriately addressed across the program 
life cycle. Embedded training and net-centric enabled training shall be considered the 
first alternative for cost effective delivery of instruction. The training capability 
requirements should be on par with operational systems capability. Further guidance on 











Database Entry #  
Variable 
Number 
Rater Initials:  
 
1 Report Document Title 
coding Full title, volume number if appropriate (enter in cell below) 
 
2 ADA number (DTIC) 
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3 Other reference (journal, book chapter, conference paper, other report) 
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coding warfare experimentation, R&D, ACTD, modernization, upgrade, P3I, Tech Readiness Level; Scale TBD 
 
14 Who developed training – prime, sub 
coding 0=unknown or n/a, 1=prime, 2=subcontract, 3=other 
 
15 Training Support Plan  – completeness, depth, etc. 
coding 
Qualitative judgment on training plan to maximize the use of new learning techniques, simulation 
technology, embedded training, and instrumentation that reduce demand on the training establishment; 
instructor training; HIS integration for training.  Scale TBD 
 
16 System Training Plan – completeness, depth, etc. 
coding Concepts specified for simulators, classroom, distance learning.  Scale TBD 
 
17 Embedded Training 
coding 0=unknown or n/a, 1=not included (perhaps not considered), 2= explicitly considered but not 
included,  3=included 
 
18 System Safety/Health Hazards/Survivability - training relationship specified 
coding 7 Human System Integration domains (per Mike McCauley).  Scale TBD 
 
19 Domain Integratation - training tradeoffs between domains 
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20 Rapid Acquisition - training consideration 
coding 0= unknown or n/a, 1 = no RA, 2=RA, 3=RA w/explicit training consideration 
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coding Measures of effectiveness/performance, 0=unknown or n/a, 1=no, 2=yes 
 
25 Collective MOE/MOPs 
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28 Based on empirical evidence 
coding 0=unknow or n/a, 1=none reported, 2=yes (human performance data reported) 
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coding 0=unknown or n/a, 1=no (non military test subjects used), 2=yes 
 
30 Quantifiable Level of Learning (Kirkpatrick Model) 
coding 
0=unknown, 1=trainee reaction, 2=learning outcomes, 3=transfer to job performance, 4=organizational 
benefit 
 
31 Based on multiple studies 
coding 0=unknown or n/a, 1=only one study/experiment, 2=more than one study/experiment 
 
32 Proprietary solution for training delivery (relates to S9) 
coding 0=unknown, 1=proprietary, 2=non proprietary (open source, Govt owned) 
 
33 Generalizability within/across system types 
coding Can the results apply equally to other systems (one or more), such as Force Application findings applying 
to the Logistics area (as identified in S2). 0=unknown or n/a, 1=yes, 2=no 
 
34 GAO Report 
coding 0= not GAO, else GAO report number 
 
35 Year of GAO Report 
coding 0=not GAO, else report year 
 
36 Shortcomings on training (effectiveness, cost, currency etc.) 
coding In abstract form 
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END NOTES AND COMMENTS - enter any observations, viewpoints etc. Open ended response. 











Training Effectiveness Evaluation of Naval Training Devices. Part 1. A Study of 
Submarine Diving Trainer Effectiveness 
1970 
Navy 
SSN594, SSN613, SSN627 
Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
The study had a dual orientation: that of considering problems inherent in evaluating trainer 
effectiveness within the context of the training environment, and evaluating the specific 
submarine diving trainer for its training effectiveness. A comparison was made between 
experienced student crew performance and inexperienced student crew performance. All 
training devices (SSN613 and SSN627) showed similar improvement in performance after 
several iterations, even though the displays and controls of each training device were different. 
The exception was the third device, SSN594, which was deemed ineffective as a substitute 
trainer for either the SSN613 or SSN627 crews. The results indicated that differences between 
the displays and controls of the SSN613 and SSN627 training devices did not impact training 
effectiveness. Rather the difference was with the effectiveness of the device itself. In that, the 
SSN594 device does not have redundant indicators of critical variables, such as trim angle, and 
provided indications in a completely different manner. Study data was not sufficient to evaluate 
trainer effectiveness of each device for the individual crews, as experienced crews were not 
available for comparison to the student crews. Another limitation of the training effectiveness 
evaluation was the amount of time in the trainer to practice complex situations. Many emergency 
situations were simply demonstrated, rather than practiced, due to lack of time. 
 Entry #12 




Human performance data reported 
 This study has several weaknesses, including a subjective performance measure.  Still, it has 
the interesting notion of using performance in low cost simulators to performance on high cost, 
high demand simulators, but the correlations are moderate, .38 is the highest.  The study 
reflects knowledge of this training-testing technique. 
 Entry #15 
Training Effectiveness Evaluation of Naval Training Devices Part II: A Study of Device 2F66A 




2F66A S-2E Trainer 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
A study was performed of the effectiveness of Device 2F66A (S-2E aircraft) in training crew 
members to perform air antisubmarine warfare missions. Although each conclusion must be 
qualified by consideration of the data sample and detailed results described in the report, it was 
possible to arrive at the following overall conclusions: 
a. The trainer was found to be effective in training all crew members. 
b. The trainer appeared to be more effective for beginning students than for operational and 
reserve personnel. 
c. Factors which instructors used to vary the difficulty of training sessions did not appear to have 
a major effect on overall trainee performance. 
d. The effect of team training sessions on student performance was consistent only during the 
early part of the first team session. 
e. Instructors considered the trainer effective in training. However, equipment malfunctions and 
insufficient fidelity have reduced confidence and lowered the overall acceptability of the device 
as an integral part of air ASW training. 
 Entry #17 
Training Effectiveness Evaluation of Naval Training Devices: An Evaluation of the 
2F69B ASW Weapon System Trainer 
1972 
Navy 
2F69B ASW Weapon System 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Two separate experiments were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the Navy 2F69B 
Weapon System Trainer. The first series of experiments were conducted in the WST. The 
second series of experiments were conducted in both the WST and airborne environment. The 
results showed that the most beneficial training occurred in the WST trainer. As a result of these 
studies, it was recommended that the number of WST training sessions be increased, and the 
number of training flights be reduced accordingly. 
 Entry #2 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
A transfer of training evaluation found the simulator effective compared controls receiving no 
device training.  Five objective measures of landing performance measured during actual carrier 
qualification flights demonstrated statistically significant differences in landing performance, 
notably boarding rates.  Confirmation of the effectiveness of an A7 night carrier landing simulator 
(awareness). 
 Entry #10 
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Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
A training effectiveness evaluation of P-3C operational flight trainer was tested for effectiveness 
through a controlled transfer of training study.  Measurements were checkflight grades, number 
of flights and landings to criterion proficiency, number of check tasks, and errors during landing.  
Those pilots with six sessions of simulator training reduced flight hours by 43 percent compared 
to control groups.  This documents the value of simulation for flight training (awareness). 
 Entry #3 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Describes a methodology to aid simulator and training device design, employing users, training 
psychologists, and simulation engineers.  Empirical testing on four crew positions for AC-130 
gunship demonstrated a moderate level of effectiveness; value as design tool for 
implementation. 
 Entry #11 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Investigation of simulated spin recovery training in reducing stress during first in-flight exposure 
to power-on stalls during pilot training. 
 Entry #29 
Integration and Application of Human Resource Technologies in Weapon System Design: 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
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Effort resulted in the detailed specification of the consolidated data base with a description of 
steps necessary for development and maintenance.  The consolidated Human Resource 
Technologies to encompass maintenance manpower, instructional system development, job 
guide development, system ownership costs and human resources in design tradeoffs.  Report 
outlines major data storage for all areas identified above.  
 Entry #5 




Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
Reports the rationale, methodology and results of a study of the training capabilities of the Boom 
Operator Part-Task Trainer (BOPPT), an air refueling simulator. The study was performed as 
part of an Air Force Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) of the device.  it was found 
that all student groups trained in the BOPTT required significantly fewer air refueling attempts 
(50 versus 71) to reach proficiency in KC-135A air refueling skills than did conventionally trained 
students.  This contributes to knowledge and awareness for transfer of training from simulators 
to aircraft. 
 Entry #7 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Test of a prototype helicopter flight simulator.   Results of controlled experiments indicated 
overall training value, but difficulty training maneuvers close to the ground due to limitations of 
the visual system.  Good example of value of testing training with feedback for future simulator 
design.  Value for rapid acquisition of training simulators. 
 Entry #13 




Human performance data reported 
 This report describes a four-phase transfer to training effectiveness evaluation for Navy Device 
2B35, a computer-generated image visual display system used in the Advanced Jet phase of 
Navy Undergraduate Pilot Training.  The transfer results provide support for familiarization 








Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
This report summarizes work on seven research projects: Target handoff techniques; tank crew 
measures of effectiveness; fatigue effects of NAV goggle use; long range target recognition; 
effects of stress on performance; symbology for automated graphic displays; and suppression 
research.  In the study of long range target detection of armored vehicle patterns, crewmen 
increased their recognition performance from 47% in pretraining to 79% during training and 90% 
in the posttest phase.    
 Entry #19 
Human Resources, Logistics, & Cost Factors in Weapon System Development:  
Demonstration in Conceptual & Validation Phases of Aircraft System Acquisition  
1979 
Air Force 
Advanced Medium STOL (short takeoff and landing) Transport 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Effort resulted in the detailed specification of the consolidated data base with a description of 
steps necessary for development and maintenance.  The consolidated Human Resource 
Technologies to encompass maintenance manpower, instructional system development, job 
guide development, system ownership costs and human resources in design tradeoffs.  Report 
outlines major data storage for all areas identified above.  
 Entry #4 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Test of 'cumulative transfer effectiveness ratio'' which is the ratio of simulator training to actual 
aircraft training.  21 rated helicopter pilots were measured on trials to criterion for performance 
on 31 specific maneuvers.  A control group had no simulator training.  25 to 80 percent of 
variance in aircraft training could be accounted for by the amount of prior simulator training.  
This provides evidence for the training efficiency afforded by simulators. 
 Entry #30 
Human Resources, Logistics, and Cost Factors in Weapon System Development: 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This report describes a methodology which is useful for applying human resources, logistics, 
and cost factors in weapon system acquisition programs. The methodology, termed the 
coordinated human resources technology (CHRT), was developed from an integration of five 
individual human resources technologies: maintenance manpower modeling, instructional 
system development, job guide development, human resources in design tradeoffs, and system 
ownership costing. The CHRT methodology operates from a consolidated data base (CDB) 
which integrates data from these five technologies into a single data source. The CHRT 
methodology has two distinct capabilities: (a) it can assess the impact of baseline and 
alternative equipment designs and support plans on human resources, logistics, and ownership 
costs, and (b) it can provide an integrated maintenance personnel, training, and technical 
manual program for the system. The CHRT methodology is implemented by a number of 
computer operated models, manual operated models, and task analysis procedures. The CDB 
has both computer data files and hard copy data files. The description of the CHRT and the CDB 
is based upon a conceptual structure and the results of a preliminary tryout of the conceptual 
structure using data from the Advanced Medium STOL Transport System acquisition program. 
This methodology is applicable for tasks that are discrete, stable and well defined. 
 Entry #46 
HUMAN FACTORS AND TRAINING EVALUATION OF THE IMPROVED TOW 
VEHICLE (ITV) DURING OT/DT III 
1980 
Army 
Improved TOW vehicle. 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
The research was requested directly by the TRADOC System Manager for the Improved TOW 
Vehicle (TSM-ITV) and involved detailed interaction, coordination, and cooperative effort with 
the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency for Operational Test III and with the Army Material 
Systems Analysis Agency and the Test and Evaluation Command for Developmental Test III. 
Training developed at the Armor and Infantry Schools appeared adequate for the test 
requirements. No negative transfer of training appeared between ground-mounted TOW and ITV 
tracking systems. For knowledge gap in retention of cognitive and psychomotor skills: Skill loss 
on ITV performance appears to be greater than for TOW and gunners suggested ITV tracking 
practice on a weekly basis.  Test participants indicated that intervals between ITV practice for 
skill maintenance should be no more than one week. TOW practice sessions should be twice 
monthly. Individual gunners may require additional practice.  Basic ITV training should require 
five (5) days. An additional three days is necessary for tactics training and for operational 
experience. 
 Entry #18 
Human Resources, Logistics, and Cost Factors in Weapon System Development: 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This report documents the final part of a three-part demonstration of the coordinated human 
resources technology (CHRT) on an aircraft acquisition program. CHRT is an integration of five 
human resource technologies: maintenance manpower modeling; human resource in design 
trade-offs, instructional system development, job guide development, and system ownership 
costing. The CHRT methodology also includes a consolidated data base (CDR) which services 
the five integrated technologies. CHRT was conceived and developed (a) to assess the impact 
of system design and support plans on human resource, logistics, and cost throughout 
acquisition, and (b) to facilitate the implementation of an integrated personnel, training and 
technical manual support approach. In this part of the demonstration, CHRT and the CDB were 
applied to the avionics and landing gear system of the Advanced Medium STOL transport 
(AMST) using data projected for the minimum engineering development phase. This phase may 
be considered similar to full-scale development but lesser in scope. The following results were 
achieved. First, manpower requirements, training requirements, technical manual requirements, 
reliability, maintainability, and system ownership costs were assessed and quantified for several 
avionics and landing gear design and support alternative at various levels of system detail. 
Second, a sample integrated training program and technical manual were prepared fro a 
selected landing gear maintenance task. Third the consolidated database was continued and 
expanded for both the avionics and landing gear systems. 
 Entry #42 
Preparation and design for a training effectiveness evaluation of device 2F64C for 




Human performance data reported 
 This report presents the initial effort in a program to assess the training potential of a new 
simulator (Device 2F64 C) for training SH-3 replacement helicopter pilots. The report contains a 
description of the training situation at the fleet readiness squadron prior to and during transition 
to a new curriculum that resulted from an instructional system development (ISD) program. The 
report also discusses TAEG initiatives to enhance training of replacement helicopter pilots and 
factors impacting syllabi content and syllabus development. Detailed scenarios are described to 
ensure effective syllabus implementation. An experimental plan for assessing training 
effectiveness of the 2f64C is included.   Gap Analysis:  Classified as “best practice report”, 
addressing a Knowledge Gap by testing the efficacy of applied ISD  (task analysis; syllabus 
development and performance assessment) for a training system prior to operational 
acceptance. 
 Entry #57 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
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The present report was written in response to an air combat training Fleet Project Team (FPT) 
requirement that a performance measurement system (PMS) for the Navy Tactical Aircrew 
Training System (TACTS) be developed. It provides a context for the problem and value of 
performance measurement as well as a set of specific functional requirements for a PMS for air-
-to-air combat training. In addition, the report provides systematic documentation for the 
conclusion that, with the development of the extremely impressive TACTS instrumentation 
technology, there was no parallel development to provide a system of human performance 
measurement to support that capability. It is thought that development of a PMS, which meets 
the requirements presented here, will greatly assist in more fully accomplishing the original 
operational training requirements which led to development of the TACTS facility. It is concluded 
that while the existing TACTS represents a highly advanced aviation engineering technology 
that can provide extremely valuable training, that same technology has largely ignoring the 
functional requirements for a system of human performance measurement. Improvements in the 
TACTS performance measurement capabilities will improve its training value even further. 
Performance data are essential to the training process. Measures of ACM subtask skills allow 
the instructor to monitor the progress of training, as well as to provide diagnostic feedback 
regarding problem areas. Both norm-referenced and criterion-referenced standards of aircrew 
proficiency can be established. These behavioral criteria and associated standards inform the 
instructor and student as to what is to be trained and to what level. Training effectiveness 
evaluations (TEEs) are then possible. The use of simulated weapons and targets has greatly 
decreased the cost (and increased the safety) of ACM practice. The producer of the 
instrumented air combat ranges for both the Navy and the Air Force estimates that the 
TACTS/ACMI reduces air combat training costs by more than $100 million annually (Cubic 
Corporation, 1978). According to Bill Dollard (1980), the TACTS manager at Miramar, the first 
system developed for Miramar cost approximately $25 million in R&D and installation of the 
system in an operational mode. The system costs less than $1,000 an hour to operate. 
However, these savings must be assessed in terms of performance effectiveness measures on 
the TACTS. In view of the above described limitations of original TACTS PMS, the recent FPT 
message seating the need to develop a PM system for use with the TACTS, and the 
tremendous potential value of TACTS performance criteria, it is clear that functional 
requirements for a PM system should be identified. Psychometric Requirements: objectivity, 
reliability, validity, sensitivity, and quality control. Training Requirements: evaluative, diagnostic, 
remedial, timely, affordable, adaptable, automated, manageable, accessible, and acceptable. 
 Entry #6 




Human performance data reported 
 Training effectiveness evaluation of an upgrade to C-130 simulator, with addition of instrument 
flight simulator featuring simultaneous training of pilot, copilot, flight engineer, and navigator.  A 
blended approach of classroom and simulator training on AF crews indicated a training 
effectiveness ratio of .5 with comparison to a control group not received the simulator training.  
This contributes to awareness about evaluating training of equipment upgrades. 
 Entry #43 






Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
TEE Study; Knowledge Gap . TEE experiment with military avionics technicians using 2D 
maintenance trainer. The intent of the study was to examine possible expanded use of 
simulation to improve training value and cost effectiveness of maintenance training. Individual 
maintenance troubleshooting skill and procedural knowledge were tested. Cost date, covering a 
15 year life cycle were also studied.  
 Entry #33 
Training Effectiveness Evauation (TEE) of the Advanced Fire Fighting Training System 
1983 
Navy 
Advanced Fire Fighting Training System 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Effort resulted in the detailed specification of the consolidated data base with a description of 
steps necessary for development and maintenance.  The consolidated Human Resource 
Technologies to encompass maintenance manpower, instructional system development, job 
guide development, system ownership costs and human resources in design tradeoffs.  Report 
outlines major data storage for all areas identified above.  
 Entry #20 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
The Part Task Trainer for Shiphandling (PARTT-SHIP) device represents one portion of the 
Naval Training Equipment Center's shiphandling research program. This device was functional 
defined after conducting a Navy shiphandling task analysis, and developing a functional 
specification for a trainer to accomplish approximately 80 percent of the training objectives 
required for basic and intermediate level shiphandlers. The PARTT-SHIP is a pre-prototype of a 
part-task shiphandling trainer. The pre-prototype is a low cost version that mimics the actual 
capabilities of a fully capable shiphandling part-task trainer. The goal of building a pre-prototype 
was to demonstrate and evaluate in several ways the capability of the actual device which could 
be built. The quantitative portion of the PARTT-SHIP demonstration was recorded for Training 
Effectiveness Evaluation purposes. In both collision avoidance and restricted waters training, 
experimental results showed PARTT-SHIP to be an equally effective training device compared 
to a full bridge simulator. Results indicate a potential for PARTT-SHIP as part of a total 
shiphandling training system. 
 Entry #32 




M16A1 Rifle, TOW, DRAGON 
Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
Effort resulted in the detailed specification of the consolidated data base with a description of 
steps necessary for development and maintenance.  The consolidated Human Resource 
Technologies to encompass maintenance manpower, instructional system development, job 
guide development, system ownership costs and human resources in design tradeoffs.  Report 
outlines major data storage for all areas identified above.  
 Entry #54 
On-The-Job Training: Development and Assessment of a Methodology for Generating 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This report describes the development and assessment of a methodology for generating on-the-
job training task proficiency assessment instruments. The development procedures allow 
subject-matter experts without experience in assessment methodology, to construct task 
proficiency assessment instruments which can be used by supervisors to assess trainee 
proficiency at specific tasks. The reliability and validity of the procedures and of the forms 
resulting from procedural application were examined in two Air Force career fields, aircraft 
maintenance and security police. The results of the procedural assessment indicated that SMEs 
could reliably apply the development procedures to construct training evaluation forms which 
accurately and completely depict the critical aspects of task performance. This report includes a 
detailed descriptions of the assessment methodologies and results.    Knowledge Gap input:  
The ability to accurately and objectively assess an individual's level of performance on the job is 
important to major systems for personnel selection, assignment, training, and utilization.  This 
can be useful in Developmental Testing, offering standardization with regard to the construction 
of assessment instruments, administration of performance evaluations, the scoring of results, 
and providing feedback.  Implementation Gap input:  The structured technique described in this 
report for assessing performance, on the job or during development/operational testing can 
provide structured feedback to system designers. 
 Entry #41 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
TEE Study; Knowledge Gap . Used subjective evaluation (trainee reaction) to limited field of 
view simulation. Military pilots completed a questionnaire following simulation training. Study 
focused on examining the effectiveness of limited field of view. 
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 Entry #36 
MANPRINT Findings from the Investigative Operational Assessment of the Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) 
1988 
Joint 
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) 
Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
This report addressed training only in the context of the Investigative Operational Assessment 
(IOA) and covered training to test operator and maintenance training for the specific test event.  
 Entry #49 




Forward Area Air Defense Systems (FAADS) 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Testifying before Congress in 1977, an Army official stated that "We expect this somewhat 
unorthodox approach to permit a much reduced development time, thus resulting in an earliest 
fielding date, albeit with higher but acceptable risks.”  Despite the use of many off the shelf 
technologies that were intended to allow rapid and low-cost development, a series of technical 
problems and massive cost overruns resulted in the cancellation of the Sergeant York project in 
1985 by the Secretary of Defense.        Although much of the processing of the collected data 
was also cancelled or brought to a hasty conclusion, an extensive follow-on evaluation was 
conducted.  The research documented the analysis of training and human factors-related data 
from the Sgt York Follow-On Evaluation I, which generated objective performance measures on 
individual soldier, team, and system performance.  Objective performance data were examined 
with respect to fourteen issues, such as varying target workloads on the operator or the negative 
impact of some semi-automation.  The data yielded findings on many issues relevant to the 
design of a future area air defense system. The report provides suggestions on applying such 
data to future soldier-system performance models, which can be remarkably helpful in making 
decisions about future FAADS.  Awareness Gap input:  Failures of cancelled system can lead to 
training and performance improvements in similar, follow on systems if properly analyzed.  
Implementation Gap input: Maintaining detailed human performance data during DT/OT allows 
secondary analyses for other system designers. 
 Entry #52 
Embedded Training Software Specifications for the FOG-M System Demonstration 
1989 
Army 
FOG-M, Fiber-Optic Guided Missile 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 54 
This report describes embedded training (ET) concepts investigated for the FOG-M, Fiber-Optic 
Guided Missile, system being developed by the U.S. Army Missile Command. This document 
presents ET software specifications for a demonstration of FOG-M. Specifications are included 
for embedded mission simulation, computer-aided instruction, and part-task training of the FOG-
M gunner. The structured specifications are intended for use by FOG-M programmers-who will 
design and code the ET software.  Knowledge Gap input:  Detailed example of functions and 
structures to embed training in software packages of a weapon system. 
 Entry #53 
Line of Sight-Forward (Heavy) Surrogate Assessment 
1989 
Army 
Line of Sight-Forward 
Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
The concept feasibility assessment was conducted using two manufacturers' prototype or 
"surrogate" weapon systems to provide baseline data for addressing manpower, personnel, and 
training issues.  A front-end analysis identified mission and performance requirements. The 
training requirements analysis was guided by the TRADOC systems approach to training.  
Analyses indicated that the Army can support such a system with respect to quality of personnel 
and ability to train these personnel.  The gunner's engagement task requires a seven-step 
operational sequence divided: between two hand-operated control devices and one foot switch. 
It is recommended that this method be studied to determine its trainability and impact on system 
effectiveness.  Knowledge Gap input:  This study provides an example of how to examine 
training requirements in a front-end analysis, with positive results. 
 Entry #48 
Simulation-Based Assessment of Automated Command, Control, and Communication 
Capabilities for Armor Crews and Platoons: The Intervehicular Information System 
1991 
Army 
Inter Vehicular Information System (IVIS) 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
The Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) is an automated C3 display in the upgraded Block 
2 M1 Abrams tank. This simulation-based research compared the performance of tank crews 
and tank platoons using a prototype IVIS with the performance of tank crews and tank platoons 
using conventional C3 and navigational tools, including a radio, paper map, protractor, and 
compass.  Armor crews and platoons equipped with IVIS significantly outperformed the crews 
and platoons using conventional techniques on every composite measure evaluated. IVIS-
equipped crews and platoons executed a C3 exercise and offensive and defensive combat 
missions faster, reported their own location and battlefield events better, and successfully 
executed more fragmentary orders than crews and platoon equipped with conventional tools.  
Awareness Gap input: The findings suggest critical Armor performance and training implications 
and identified 25 design issues in areas such as report queueing and routing, position 
navigation, and icons.  These can be generalized to other command, control, and 








C3I Test-Instrumentation System: MANPRINT Evaluation of the Data Collection 
Subsystem 
Human performance data reported 
Not generalizable 
There was no formal training program developed or planned and a formal training evaluation 
was not conducted. 
 Entry #50 
Training Requirements Analysis for the Combat Vehicle Command and Control System 
Tactical Operations Center 
1992 
Army 
Close Combat Tactical Trainer 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This research describes the results of a training requirements analysis conducted to support 
development of the Combat Vehicle Command and Control System. The CVCC is a set of 
selected futuristic components with functions simulated in the Close Combat Test Bed 
environment. The objective of the task analysis was to (1) provide the minimum essential task 
information needed to support the early assessment of CVCC Tactical Operations Center 
training requirements and (2) assess which TOC tasks and skills should be included in future 
training programs.  Knowledge Gap input: Application of training analysis techniques in refining 
requirements as determined by user experiences in simulated environments. 
 Entry #51 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Report is an application of HARDMAN III methodology, a suite of software tools to improve the 
design and acquisition process for hardware and software systems that applies mission 
simulation to examine  manpower, personnel, and training constraints.  It was applied to a 
proposed improvement (Navigation Emplacement System) to the Patriot Air Defense System.  
The analyses included system performance requirements and projected manpower and 
personnel characteristics for Patriot occupational specialties in the fielding years; it also included 
workload analyses and analyses of the effects of personnel quality and training and 
environmental stressors on mission performance. The Patriot Growth Application is a good 
example of the concept, methodology, and output of HARDMAN III analyses through user 
participation on an actual system.  Awareness Gap input:  The HARDMAN methodology can be 
applied to the hardware/software subsystem requirements of major acquisitions from a 
personnel and training point of view. 
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 Entry #9 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
A case study of implementing an Integrated Product Team structure into an AF System Program 
Office for the F-22.  A Training Systems IPT is identified on p. 14, but no other explicit mention 
of system training.  The results indicated there were problems with the implementation of the IPT 
concept. 
 Entry #40 
Using the Backward Transfer Paradigm to Validate the 63007A AH-64 for Simulator 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
TEE Study- knowledge gap. The main purpose of the study was to test the effectiveness of this 
simulator in training tasks required for later more advanced simulator and aircraft qualification 
skills. The backward training method, at the time, was an established means to teach landing 
and hovering tasks. There was concern that the visual system would limit effectiveness. 
 Entry #21 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This study provided good insights into design of training systems for optimum training benefit. It 
also offered five general areas for future research for improved IOS designs. 
 Entry #26 
Formative Evaluations of the VESUB Technology Demonstration System 
1997 
Navy 
VESUB Technology Demonstration System 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 57 
Use of VR provided training opportunities that are not available during operations with the actual 
equipment in actual situations. Training that will expose junior officers to a variety of challenging 
geographical and environmental conditions is very limited since most Commanding Officers put 
the most experienced officers on watch during challenging situations. 
 Entry #22 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Use of this technology provided significant performance enhancements over current 
approaches, and shows merit for inclusion in acquisition programs. However, this is a training 
system development, not a weapon system. This report provides insights into how weapon 
system acquisition programs should address training requirements for areas lacking sufficient 
detail or rigor to adequately addresses operational training requirements. This report did not 
address cost analysis, implementation or sustainment of the system. 
 Entry #45 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Knowledge Gap -- The purpose of the study was to determine the effectiveness of a specific 
trainer for submarine personnel. The VSUB trainer fills a submarine training gap because 
training systems existing at the time did not provide detailed harbor and channel ship handling 
training for the officer of the deck. 
 Entry #23 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Six conclusions and recommendations were provided to support future improvements in VE 
training system development: 1) VESUB provides effective shiphandling training; 2) team 
communications is a must in the development of complex systems; 3) legacy-based system 
development must be closely evaluated; 4) configuration management is essential for success; 
5) complex scenes require sufficient fidelity to support training requirements; and 6) VE offers 
unique presentation capabilities that should be exploited. 
 Entry #35 
 58 




Human performance data reported 
 This short report described a human factors engineering study of night vision enhancement for 
Army vehicle drivers.  Two systems, Driver's Vision Enhancer (DVE) and Night Vision Goggles 
(NVG) were used to detect known drop-offs in the road while driving a HMMWV. The data were 
not reported. A related study of non responsive pixels found found no significant effect of display 
variations.  Training was never discussed.  
 Entry #58 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 
A critical component to be considered in systems acquisition--and the earlier the better--is 
human performance. In this report, the importance of using human performance modeling in 
order to impact system design, performance, and cost is addressed. The examples given here 
are all based on models developed with the capabilities present in IMPRINT (the Improved 
Performance Research Integration Tool), developed by the Human Research and Engineering 
Directorate of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory.  The broad use of models and simulations is 
being encouraged in the military at this time, the catch phrase being “simulation-based 
acquisition” (SBA). The answer to the question “When should human performance modeling be 
used?” is "Early, and often in order to ascertain the basic system requirements, the precursor to 
design, and the role of the human." A classic example from the U.S. Army concerns what is now 
the Comanche helicopter. It was first envisioned as a one-man scout and attack helicopter, but 
early assessments of expected task performance, mental workload, and reliance on automation 
proved the basic concept to be unworkable. Today, Comanche is being built as a two man 
helicopter, a change which would have been impossible to effect later in the acquisition process 
without a complete and costly re-design. Another example of the application of IMPRINT's task 
network modeling capability was the modeling of the Land Warrior system and U.S. Army’s 
Crusader system, originally the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS).  Knowledge Gap input:  
Example of human performance model applied to several systems, Army and Navy, resulting in 
design changes with impact on training. 
Entry #39 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 59 
Knowledge Gap . Measurement Method Study:The purpose of the study was to identify and 
define methods for incorporating relevant  war fighting criteria into manpower, personnel and 
training. Authors state that R&D program descriptions and impact statements are critical. 
Research scientists are not clear on what the criteria are or where or how to get measures. The 
study focused on identifying material on MOEs/MOPs important to AF aircraft -related mission 
effectiveness. 
 Entry #28 
An Assessment of the Lead Systems Integrator Concept as Applied to the Future 
Combat Systems Program 
2006 
Army 
Army Future Combat System (FCS)  
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 Effort resulted in the detailed specification of the consolidated data base with a description of 
steps necessary for development and maintenance.  The consolodated Human Resource 
Technologies to encompass maintenance manpower, instructional system development, job 
guide development, system owenership costs and human resources in design tradeoffs.  Report 
outlines major data storage for all areas identified above.  
 Entry #31 
Longbow Stationary Target Indicator Technical Report 
2006 
Army 
AH-64D, Apache Longbow 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Effort resulted in the detailed specification of the consolidated data base with a description of 
steps necessary for development and maintenance.  The consolodated Human Resource 
Technologies to encompass maintenance manpower, instructional system development, job 
guide development, system owenership costs and human resources in design tradeoffs.  Report 
outlines major data storage for all areas identified above.  
 Entry #38 
Looking Back at 20 Years of MANPRINT on Patriot:  Observations and Lessons 
2007 
Army 
Patriot Missile System 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Training issues constituted the second general lesson emerging from the twenty five year 
evolution of the Patriot program. System enhancements (new hardware, software,etc. 
progressively made the system more complex.  However, the Increase in training requirments 




A Littoral Combat Ship Manpower Analysis using the Fleet Response Training Plan 
2007 
N 
Littoral Combat Ship 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
The training requirements for each sailor assigned to the LCS, according to the Preliminary 
Design Interim Requirements Document, will use a human-centered design approach to 
automate decision processes that optimize manpower workload. This approach exploits 
SMARTSHIP technologies to decrease personnel workload without compromising the design 
capability to fulfill mission requirements. This is done to the maximum extent practicable in order 
to provide on-demand individual and team training mission rehearsal  capability, both inport and 
underway. The LCS training infrastructure will incorporate a responsive and flexible training 
architecture in order to deliver a full range of training products and services wherever and 
whenever required. The onboard training systems will span the training continuum from warfare 
capabilities, maintenance, and logistics to professional, military, leadership and personal 
enrichment training. This approach cultivates the total sailor and supports the tenets of Sea 
Warrior. Another feature of the training system is its availability to exercise all levels of 
progressive, basic, intermediate, and advanced training, which includes team, unit, group, joint, 
and coalition training that culminates in unrestricted operations certification. A mixture of 
modeling and simulation systems, embedded on-board trainers, web-enabled or PCbased 
distance learning systems, and netted classroom environments will be installed to facilitate this 
paradigm shift in manpower and training philosophies. Manpower requirements are based on 
mission, functions, and tasks and/or required operational capability and the projected 
operational environment. A ship’s workload is determined using industrial engineering 
techniques to yield those manpower requirements. The Littoral Combat Ship’s total manpower 
requirements have been set at 75 and plans are in motion to train the first Littoral Combat ship 
core crew prior to stepping onboard. Once the Littoral Combat Ship is commissioned and the 
core crew of 40 is fully prepared to take the deck, it will enter its first training phase commonly 
known as the Unit Level Training and Readiness Assessment. This research centered around a 
40-member crew conducting its first training certification using completed tasks, fatigue levels, 
and workload as measures of performance to validate its manpower requirements. Crew 
certification is mandatory for all new construction ships in which an emphasis is placed on the 
review of the ship’s overall training program, the ability to provide a minimum number of qualified 
crewmembers to support all underway requirements, and whether all training objectives are 
being satisfied. After the crew certification period, core crews will experience an evaluation 
within the initial phase of training called the Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP). This 
assessment is called the Unit Level Training and Readiness Assessment (ULTRA). The current 
challenge is whether a core crew of 40 can effectively complete an extensive 14-day training 
assessment within acceptable fatigue levels. 
 Entry #44 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 61 
TEE Study; Knowledge Gap . The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
virtual terrain board (NVG training typically uses a physical terrain board) to teach NVG 
capabilities and limitations. Study focused on the feasiblitiy of replacing the physical board with a 
virtual simulation of same. 
 Entry #1 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This evaluation assessed the effectiveness of the Recognition of Combatants-Improvised 
Explosive Devices (ROC-IED) computer-based training program as a stand-alone training aid 
and as a training aid that can supplement the training given by the unit’s trainer.  The evaluation 
employed military test subjects and used three experimental conditions measuring two levels of 
learning outcomes.  The results indicated the knowledge level of Counter IED can be taught 
through computer based training. 
 Entry #27 
Understanding Demonstration-based Training: A Definition, Conceptual Framework, and 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This report explains a multi-level framework for designing training that offers, based on empirical 
data and sound theory, a systematic and more affordable approach to developing the full range 
of training strategies within an acquisition program.  
 Entry #59 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 62 
This document summarizes the process used to create Mission Essential Competencies (MECs 
SM) for Reaper. It presents the final MECs and supporting competencies identified during the 
MEC process, as well as the associated Reaper knowledge and skills, learning environments, 
mission types, and experiences. MECs are higher-order individual, team, and inter-team 
competencies that a fully prepared pilot, operator, crew or flight requires for successful mission 
completion under adverse conditions in a non-permissive environment.  Training programs for 
combat aviators have historically focused on in-flight training, not always being able to replicate 
the dynamic environment encountered during wartime operations. The inability to reliably and 
safely train in a highly realistic combat environment results in an adaptation period for aircrews 
during the initial stages of a conflict. This adaptation period represents a gap between what 
could be realistically trained and what is expected in the combat arena.  Training using 
Distributed Mission Operations simulations overcomes this shortcoming.   The Air Force, ACC 
has a methodology that focuses on mission execution in a non-permissive environment, 
centering on identifying the competencies (or MECs) required for mission completion during 
combat, as well as the knowledge and skills, supporting competencies, and experiences 
required for MEC proficiency.  
 Entry #60 
BW 




Global Hawk UAV 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This document summarizes the process used to create Mission Essential Competencies (MECs 
SM) for Global Hawk. It presents the final MECs and supporting competencies identified during 
the MEC process, as well as the associated Global Hawk knowledge and skills, learning 
environments, mission types, and experiences. MECs are higher-order individual, team, and 
inter-team competencies that a fully prepared pilot, operator, crew or flight requires for 
successful mission completion under adverse conditions in a non-permissive environment.  
Training programs for combat aviators have historically focused on in-flight training, not always 
being able to replicate the dynamic environment encountered during wartime operations. The 
inability to reliably and safely train in a highly realistic combat environment results in an 
adaptation period for aircrews during the initial stages of a conflict. This adaptation period 
represents a gap between what could be realistically trained and what is expected in the combat 
arena.  Training using Distributed Mission Operations simulations overcomes this shortcoming.   
The Air Force, ACC has a methodology that focuses on mission execution in a non-permissive 
environment, centering on identifying the competencies (or MECs) required for mission 
completion during combat, as well as the knowledge and skills, supporting competencies, and 
experiences required for MEC proficiency.   Six MECs are identified for the Global Hawk:  Plan 
and Prepare for Mission, Conduct Aircraft Launch/ Recovery Sequence, Conduct Aircraft 
Handoff/ Change-over, Collect Targets, Conduct Post Mission Review, Manage Crew Workload. 
 Entry #61 





Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
This document summarizes the process used to create Mission Essential Competencies (MECs 
SM) for Predator. It presents the final MECs and supporting competencies identified during the 
MEC process, as well as the associated Predator knowledge and skills, learning environments, 
mission types, and experiences. MECs are higher-order individual, team, and inter-team 
competencies that a fully prepared pilot, operator, crew or flight requires for successful mission 
completion under adverse conditions in a non-permissive environment.  Training programs for 
combat aviators have historically focused on in-flight training, not always being able to replicate 
the dynamic environment encountered during wartime operations. The inability to reliably and 
safely train in a highly realistic combat environment results in an adaptation period for aircrews 
during the initial stages of a conflict. This adaptation period represents a gap between what 
could be realistically trained and what is expected in the combat arena.  Training using 
Distributed Mission Operations simulations overcomes this shortcoming.   The Air Force, ACC 
has a methodology that focuses on mission execution in a non-permissive environment, 
centering on identifying the competencies (or MECs) required for mission completion during 
combat, as well as the knowledge and skills, supporting competencies, and experiences 
required for MEC proficiency.   Six MECs are identified for the Predator: Plan and Prepare for 
Mission, Conduct Aircraft Handoffs, Prepare for Mission Execution, Collect Targets, Employ Air-
Ground Weapons, Conduct Post Mission Review, Manage Crew Workload, Conduct MAC 
Operations, Launch and Recovery. 
 Entry #8 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
The report presented a review of applicable Science and Technology issues for the design of 
instruction related to preparing airmen to defend against and respond to cyber threats to their 
networks.  The report provided a notional framework for a testbed offering multiple opportunities 
for future expansion to other platforms and a rich environment in which to explore the effects of 
cyber attacks.  The report provides an awareness for the design of future training systems.  
Related to NetCentric functional capability. 
 Entry #24 
KC-135 Simulator Systems Engineering Case Study 
2010 
Air Force 
KC-135 Aircrew Training System (ATS) 
Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 64 
Report states that simulators can provide more indepth training than can be accomplished in 
airplanes and provide a very high transfer of learning and behavior from the simulator to the 
airplane. The use of simulators has resulted in safer flight training and cost reductions for the 
operators as well as improvided fuel conservation and reduction in adverse environmental 
effects. The KC-135 training systems is managed and funded as a separate but related 
acquisition program. Major modifications, particularly to the Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), 
have been successfully planned for, budgeted, and implemented over the past 17 years. There 
are several reasons on why this teaming relationship has succeeded. Typically with acquisition 
programs the program manager or chief engineer charged with the development program would 
chair major reviews (like the KC-135 ATS System Review Board [SRB]) with the using command 
(in this case AMC) providing a briefing of their issues and concerns at the SRB. However, the 
arrangement that has evolved for KC-135 ATS, which has proven to be very effective, is that the 
AMC manager co-chairs the SRB forum. AMC, the ATS Program Office, and the prime 
contractor(s) draw on support as needed to ensure proper staffing is available for program 
execution. Another reason for the team’s success is their ability to be flexible and react quickly 
to customer needs. The team also utilizes a requirement verification and prioritization review 
board (called the SPRR System Priority Requirements Review) that, in addition to upgrades 
driven by weapon system changes, addresses sustainment related hardware and software 
deficiencies/upgrades required to improve flight simulator fidelity. Prioritization reviews include 
representatives from the KC-135 Program Office, Ogden, Contractors (aircraft and simulator), 
and user. Part of the reason for the effectiveness of the KC-135 ATS upgrade program is the 
simulator team has, over a period of 17 years, evolved into a very effective organization. One of 
the challenges facing the Government in 2010, when the current contract is recompeted, will be 
to foster the advantages associated with long-term support contracts (i.e., workforce continuity, 
knowledgeable support personnel, program stability, sense of ownership, incentives for process 
improvements, incentive for long-range planning) while meeting the  government’s requirements 
for increased competition and shorter term contracts. 
 Entry #25 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
Offered a systems engineering methodology for development of leading indicators for more 
effective program decisions based on more than just cost and schedule. But, did not address 
human performance or training metrics. The report also cited the challenges with consistent 
availability of program data for this methodology. Lastly, the report suggested maturation to 
address total ownership cost control. 
 Entry #34 




Human performance data reported 
Generalizable 
 65 
This paper from SPAWAR describes how HSI contributes to the Acquisition of Command & 
Control systems.  Emphasis is given to Human Factors Engineering issues and HSI processes 
and reports.  Training is listed as a domain of HSI and the need for a Total Systeme Training 
Architecture (TSTA) is noted along with a Navy Training System Plan (NTSP).  
   









The report states that poor low observable reliability and lengthy maintenance times reduce 
mission capable rates, adversely affect aircraft availability for crew training, restrict operations 
when deployed, and limit sustained combat operations. 
 Entry #502 





The assessment concluded that the ASW program of record as contained in the proposed 
President’s fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the likely future threat and identified 
the following near-, mid-, and long-term ASW mission requirements.       Near term 
requirements: Improve ASW crew proficiency by increasing training. 
 Entry #503 





In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the projected range and sensor tracking 
capability of AIM-9X without the helmet-mounted cueing system is equivalent to the capability of 
the AA-11 threat missile in azimuth and exceeds the capability of the AA-11 in range. DOD’s 
position is based on using the fighter aircraft radar to cue the AIM-9X missile to the target of 
interest when it is beyond the view of the aircraft’s heads-up display. Using the radar to cue the 
missile, however, will take more time and be less certain than with the helmet and will require 
DOD to train pilots in yet to be developed procedures and tactics that would be considerably 
different than current practices for aerial combat. 
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 Entry #504 





In the early operational assessment of the Predator’s ACTD demonstration, the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation, did not make a determination of the system’s potential 
operational effectiveness or suitability. However, the system was found to be deficient in several 
areas, including mission reliability, documentation, and pilot training. The assessment also 
noted that the ACTD demonstration was not designed to evaluate several other areas such as 
system survivability, supportability, target location accuracy, training, and staffing requirements. 
 Entry #505 





DOD is proceeding with plans to procure a fleet of JPATS aircraft that may exceed the quantity 
needed to meet training requirements. Until inconsistencies in the data used to calculate 
JPATS requirements are resolved, it is unclear how many aircraft should be procured. 
Furthermore, DOD’s schedule for procuring the aircraft does not take advantage of the most 
economical approach that would allow it to save money and permit more time for operational 
testing. 
 Entry #506 





The estimated support costs, which included those of data, training, peculiar support 
equipment, and software support, were not based on a comprehensive analysis by the Air 
Force. Justification provided by the Air Force for the costs was incomplete, based on other 
weapon systems, or preliminary in nature. B-2 program officials stated that the cost estimate for 
support of the B-2 is not firm because the overall support concept for the 20 aircraft program has 
not yet been decided. They stated that a more accurate estimate of support cost will be available 
when the 1994 President’s budget is announced.   The peculiar support cost element includes 
$1.266 billion associated with the support of the production aircraft and simulators, procurement 
of technical data, and procurement of items for maintenance training equipment. 
 Entry #507 






The DIVAD program, however, was terminated by the Secretary of Defense in August 1985 
because it could not handle the stand-off attack helicopter threat. Army analysis and training 
had revealed that the projected air threat could strike ground forces from distances beyond the 
range of current frontline missile systems and the DIVAD. 
 Entry #508 





The oversight effort was conducted in partnership with the Army’s Operational Test and 
Evaluation Command, in recognition of the unique nature of the experiment (as distinct from an 
operational test). The Director’s report also identified a lack of (1) adequate digital connectivity; 
(2) maturity of the Applique and the Tactical Internet; (3) adequate tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for operations with digital equipment; and (4) tactical skills resulting from inadequate 
unit collective training. 
 Entry #509 






Our review showed that the Navy’s statements about the performance of the E/F reflect the 
performance of the Emodel aircraft, not the less capable F model. Also, the statements reflect 
the projected aircraft performance, not the actual performance being demonstrated in flight tests. 
Specifically, the Navy.s performance values include anticipated, but not yet demonstrated, range 
improvements. If these values are not included in the performance estimates, the F model 
aircraft will be 33 nautical miles short of meeting its interdiction range requirement. This is 
significant because (1) the F model, which was originally planned to be used as a trainer aircraft 
and therefore made up only about 20 percent of the total buy, now comprises about 56 percent 
of the total buy and (2) increased range over the current C/D aircraft was critical to justifying the 
decision to buy the F/A-18E/F. 
 Entry #510 






DOD has experienced a mixture of successes and problems in implementing Global Command 
and Control System. For example, users like some of the additional features it provides 
compared to the old system and found them productive. These features include mission-related 
communications by e-mail, internet-like web pages, and on-line discussion groups. Users also 
like the idea of being provided situational awareness of the battlefield. However, some key 
capabilities, such as the system’s operational planning function and the situational awareness 
function, have experienced problems and are performing less effectively than expected. Also, 
operator training is deficient, data exchange procedures with coalition partner have not been 
defined, and the system is at risk of failure because year 2000 problems have not been fully 
resolved. 
 Entry #511 






The Javelin is designed to significantly improve the Army's antitank capability. This capability is 
limited by the weather, the gunner's distance from the target, and the gunner's training. 
However, there are some questions as to whether training will be adequate to prepare the 
soldier to (1) acquire valid targets and (2) identify friend from foe without additional equipment, 
which is not yet developed.  We discussed the Javelin's ability to identify friend from foe with 
officials from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington D.C.; 
and the Javelin Project Office. We also discussed the training aspects of this issue and 
reviewed documents from the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; Center for 
Night Vision and Electra-Optics, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the Javelin Project Office. Training 
officials at the U.S. Army Infantry School consider the currently planned Javelin gunner training 
inadequate in the areas of recognition and identification. In their opinion, the training will not 
adequately teach gunners to use the Javelin's infrared optics to recognize tanks from wheeled 
vehicles or identify friendly tanks from enemy tanks.  A Javelin logistics official said the Javelin 
training will teach gunners to use the system--that is, turn it on, lock-on to targets, and fire the 
missile. In addition, an Army Infantry School official said gunners will be taught general thermal 
recognition and identification. However, both said the gunners will not be taught to recognize or 
identify thermal images as seen through the Javelin optics. According to an Army research 
psychologist, the current training software will not teach gunners to recognize (1) moving 
targets, (2) targets with approximately the same temperature as that of their background, or (3) 
targets whose image is degraded by electronic noise --as the Javelin's images frequently are. 
 Entry #512 






Javelin’s Chief of Logistics said the Army cannot afford to maintain both the low-rate production 
and redesigned launch unit configurations. He said that if soldiers were given different launch 
units, the Army would have to maintain inventory and train personnel to repair both 
configurations. In addition, the Army would have to develop and produce test equipment for the 
low-rate production configuration because it will not have built-in-test equipment to diagnose 
system failures. 
 Entry #513 





In some instances, problems were attributed to shortfalls in operator training or another non-
materiel cause. The majority of deficiencies involved software fixes, not major hardware 
redesign. The Army has also gained experience operating the GSMs assigned to the III Corps 
and XVIII Airborne Corps and in training and preparation for multi-service OT&E. In November 
1995, the Program Executive Officer for Joint STARS certified the system ready for OT&E, 
which attests to the developer’s confidence in system maturity. 
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This upgrade effort, while compatible with the Army’s terminal testing schedule, will require the 
Army to reconfigure its equipment and software and retrain its forces when the automated 
communications management system becomes available at a future date.  Military Strategic and 
Tactical Relay (AF manages). 
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Evaluation of the Navy's 1999 Naval Surface Fire Support Assessment 
1999 
Navy 
Navy Surface Fire Support 
NSIAD-99-225 
The estimated cost cited for reactivating the U.S.S. Wisconsin was $209.4 million and for the 
U.S.S. Iowa, was $221.3 million, including repair of the damaged turret.  To accomplish the 
reactivation, the Navy estimated 14 months for industrial support and 3 to 6 months for 
modernization and training on and certification of newly installed equipment. 
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Additionally, the program manager told us that existing documentation will be augmented by 
word-of-mouth and on-the-job training. In our opinion, this approach is not adequate for a 
system as large and important as NALCOMIS. Although system maintenance may be possible 
without a manual, it will undoubtedly be more difficult and costly than necessary. 
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The desire of program sponsors to keep cost estimates as low as possible and to present 
attractive milestone schedules has encouraged the use of unreasonable assumptions about the 
pace and magnitude of the technical effort, material costs, production rates, savings from 
competition, and other factors. In some cases, acquisition cost estimates have been kept low by 
excluding relevant program costs-such as the cost of training equipment-which should be 
included in program cost estimates.          Successful performance of missions, assuming well 
trained operators and reliable equipment, requires a weapon system that is operationally 
effective. “Effectiveness” generally refers to the ability of a weapon to successfully engage the 
enemy. For a majority of weapons, that means the ability to reach the target area, find targets, 
and destroy or disable them with munitions such as missiles or torpedoes.          In a 1983 
classified report on the Army’s Patriot air defense system, we reported that the diagnostic 
software used with the system’s built-in test equipment had successfully identified faulty 
components only 50 to 60 percent of the time. To address these problems, the Army upgraded 
the software, added another level of maintenance, and increased maintenance training. Initial 
investment costs for these changes was about $94 million. 
 Entry #518 





The initial operational evaluation tests were conducted from November 1988 to September 
1989. The tests included (1) captive flight tests to armor targets, (2) a force development test 
and experiments to investigate tactics, training, and crew performance, and (3) actual missile 
firings to demonstrate capability against helicopters and armored vehicles. 
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There has been a 2-month schedule slippage because problems in preliminary software design, 
development of in-class training curricula and materials, and cockpit configuration changes 
require more work than anticipated. The prime contractor is working with the subcontractors to 
develop and implement a new schedule for some tasks to meet all major milestones. 
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The Army requires that its vehicles be fielded with detailed technical manuals and other 
documentation covering the operation and maintenance of the vehicle. The Army requires 
specialized manuals because (1) Army drivers and mechanics generally are not as well trained 
as commercial drivers and mechanics. 
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The desire of program sponsors to keep cost estimates as low as possible and to present 
attractive milestone schedules has encouraged the use of unreasonable assumptions about the 
pace and magnitude of the technical effort, material costs, production rates, savings from 
competition, and other factors. In some cases, acquisition cost estimates have been kept low by 
excluding relevant program costs-such as the cost of training equipment-which should be 
included in program cost estimates. 
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The remaining 30 UOES interceptors were to be used in operational suitability tests that did not 
involve firing interceptors. However, the purposes of those tests can be accomplished with 
training rounds or with the backup demonstration and validation phase interceptors.      The 
Army also plans to conduct a 7-week limited user test after completing the 14 demonstration and 
validation flight tests. The limited user test will build on the results of the demonstration and 
validation flight tests and focus on operational effectiveness and suitability issues, including 
mission performance and system supportability. The primary events to be conducted during the 
limited user test will be field training exercises, command post exercises, modeling and 
simulations, and a flight test using an interceptor already under contract. Results from the limited 
user test are not scheduled to be available until early 1998. 
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To identify underlying reasons for the program’s difficulties, we reviewed pertinent government 
and contractor documentation, including contract files, audit reports, schedules, briefings, cost 
reports, integrated product team minutes, and contractor resolution plans and training plans. 
We also reviewed independent studies and discussed the studies’ findings with knowledgeable 
officials. We compared the results of our review to the findings of the independent studies. 
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Impediments to Availability: SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System V2 0.72 0.70 0.69 High cost of 
parts, lack of funding for parts and upgrades, parts failure, lack of technician experience, and 
training; SPS-48E Radar System 0.73 0.81 0.77 Inadequate training of shipboard technicians, 
lack of technical schematics 
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Logistics support personnel from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combat commands in the United 
States and Europe voiced a number of concerns about the potential effects that some 
reengineering efforts could have on their operational capability. These concerns involved the 
presence of increasing numbers of contractor personnel on or near the battlefield, the ability of 
contractors to meet “surge requirements”, the potential reduction of rotational positions to meet 
training requirements 
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Many units were inadequately trained in basic tasks critical to surviving and operating in a 
chemical or biological environment.    Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD’s 
Office of the Inspector General found that commanders were not integrating chemical and 
biological defense into unit exercises and the training was not always realistic in terms of how 
units would operate in war. For example, we were told by Marine Corps officers responsible for 
chemical and biological defense training at the unit we reviewed that commanders are not fully 
integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises, as required by Marine Corps 
policies, because operating in protective equipment is difficult and time consuming     In 
September 1999, we reported that the Army’s combat training centers were restricting the 
simulated use of chemical weapons against the units being trained because units were arriving 
at the centers with lower levels of proficiency in chemical and biological defense than in the past     
Officials at the units we reviewed stated that chemical and biological defense training is being 
adversely impacted by (1) a shortage of chemical and biological defense specialists and (2) 
specialists being assigned multiple responsibilities unrelated to their specialties 
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A suitability problem involves a system not satisfactorily meeting one or more requirements, 
including reliability, maintainability, logistics support, or training. These problems may delay 
progress in achieving the Navy’s vision for using information technology to attain and maintain 
network-centric warfighting knowledge and decision-making superiority.     The Pacific Fleet 
experienced 46 problems with the NavyExtremely High Frequency Satellite Communications 
System from 1995 to  2000. The problems involved hardware and software, interoperability, and 
training.     The Pacific Fleet also experienced problems with the High Frequency Radio Group, 
mainly due to system performance problems and training shortfalls. For example, on a ship visit 
in October 2000, ship communications personnel said that the system had broken down several 
times for a duration of 1 week to 1 month at a time. They said that, when it breaks down, the 
operators must tune in the radio frequency manually, but ship operators have not been trained 
to do this because they were used to relying on the system to tune into a particular frequency 
automatically. 
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Quote from JAG report: “Aircraft performance envelopes are developed, and procedures and 
guidance published (NATOPS) to prevent pilots from putting an aircraft in a situation that would 
exceed safe parameters. The MV-22 performance envelope may be one that fleet pilots can 
operate within, but given the rigors of combat, real world operations, and realistic training for 
both, the consequences of exceeding this particular envelope appears to be excessively grave 








All tactical aircraft 
GAO-01-163 
DOD has stated that as aircraft age, they tend to break more often, take longer to inspect and 
maintain, and are less available for operations and training. 
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Assessments of Major Weapon Programs 
2003 
Joint 
JPATS  PAC-3 
 
JPATS: They also reported that the full JPATS had not yet been tested due to uncorrected 
deficiencies in the aircraft and the immaturity of the software-intensive training information 
management system (p. 48).     PAC-3: However, the contractor must increase production 
earlier than planned because DOD decided to accelerate deliveries. This decision may present 
new production challenges because the contractor must find and train additional personnel. (p. 
55)      
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DOD Needs to Better Manage Automatic Test Equipment Modernization 
2003 
Joint 
Consolidated Automated Support System 
GAO-03-451 
Counterexample:  The Navy reports that the replacement of these testers with CASS 
(Consolidated Automated Support System) stations, when complete, will reduce the number of 
test-related enlisted occupational specialties from 32 to 4, thus reducing training requirements. 
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If the Air Force fails to improve the F/A-22’s reliability before fielding the aircraft, the high failure 
rates will result in higher operational and support costs to keep the aircraft available for training 
or combat use 
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At times, Air Force refueling aircraft have not been available to support Navy training due to the 
lower priority placed on Navy training by the Air Force, and sometimes training plans changed 
on relatively short-notice 
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The Air Force’s C-130 AMP will standardize the cockpit and avionics for three combat 
configurations of the C-130 fleet.     In February 2010 the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breach of the significant cost growth threshold, which it attributed to factors such as the 
omission of training devices and adequate spares from initial estimates, and delays in the 
production decision. The program has been restructured and planned dates for key events have 
been pushed back by more than 1 year. (p. 51)      WIN-T is the Army’s high-speed and high-
capacity backbone communications network.     The test results showed that WIN-T Increment 2 
did not meet its operational reliability requirements. DOD’s Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation, recommended that the Army improve performance and training to address these 
deficiencies and ensure success during initial operational test, which is scheduled for early fiscal 
year 2012. (p. 127) 
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Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on 





Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate supporting the dual award provides 
details on the costs to operate and support both designs. However, since little actual LCS 
operating and support data are available to date, the Navy’s estimates for these costs are 
currently based on data from other ships and could change as actual cost data become more 
available. These estimates are also based on new operational concepts for personnel, training, 
and maintenance that have not been fully developed, tested, and implemented. For example, 
the Navy has not yet implemented a comprehensive training plan, and it is possible that the plan 
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